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COMMON LAW BASELINES AND CURRENT
FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE
ERICA GOLDBERG*
ABSTRACT
Many of the current divisions in judges’, scholars’, and laypeople’s
approaches to free speech doctrine can be attributed to baseline
problems. There is no neutral baseline against which to measure when
the state has acted in a way that triggers constitutional scrutiny; there is no
neutral baseline against which to determine which restrictions implicate
speech that is covered by the First Amendment; and there is no neutral
baseline against which to measure when harms caused by speech justify
abridgment of that speech.
One answer to these baseline problems is to incorporate the common
law as a First Amendment baseline. The common law, as it existed at the
time of the ratification of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, serves as
a useful and constitutionally justifiable guide for understanding when
speech can be restricted due to the harms it has caused. An approach that
incorporates common law baselines is justified by the text, structure, and
history of the Constitution. Further, contrary to most scholars’ and
judges’ views, incorporating common law baselines into free speech jurisprudence accords well with current doctrine and represents a compromise
between different views of free speech at the Founding. Finally, importing
common law baselines into our understanding of how a law should be
scrutinized by free speech doctrine lends coherence to the doctrine and
helps illuminate current, emerging free speech issues. Common law baselines can help define which harms to consider in our free speech calculus,
can shed light on how to approach antidiscrimination laws that affect expression, and can even explain our current, contested libel jurisprudence.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Dayton Law School. The research
and writing of this Article was primarily performed while I was a Visiting Scholar at
Georgetown Law School’s Center for the Constitution. I am grateful to Randy
Barnett for providing me with the opportunity to serve as a Visiting Scholar and for
our many substantive discussions about this idea and its implementation and to the
students at Georgetown Law School. I am also thankful to Lawrence Solum and
Jeffrey Schmitt.
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INTRODUCTION

F

OUNDATIONAL questions about the scope of the First Amendment
have divided politicians, jurists, and academics throughout the course
of the Amendment’s interpretation.1 The divergence of approaches to
free speech jurisprudence has, in recent years, increasingly polarized the
Supreme Court, academics, and laypeople.2 Further, the question of how
best to balance free speech protections against the harms caused by
speech has led to myriad proposals for limiting the breadth of the First
Amendment’s protections, with scholars advocating for different views
about which new exceptions to First Amendment coverage courts should
recognize.3 In this Article, I offer a principled method to resolve these
academic disputes based on the history of the common law.
The methods we currently use to evaluate First Amendment issues are
notoriously unsatisfying. Because the text of the First Amendment requires that “speech” receive special protection, courts, politicians, and
commentators have created various constructs to ensure that “the freedom
of speech”4 not be abridged. The fundamental, although controversial,
distinction between speech and conduct, for example, preserves the
1. As early as the debates over the Sedition Act of 1798, members of Congress,
including Framers of the Constitution, sharply disagreed over whether the First
Amendment protected seditious libel. Compare Speech of Rep. James Otis, in 5
ANNALS OF CONG. 2097 (1798) (supporting Federalist theory that false speech that
places the government in disrepute may be punished after it is uttered), with James
Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1799–1800), in 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT,
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION . . . AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 561–67
(2d ed. 1941) (arguing against the Sedition Act’s constitutionality based on free
speech protections and lack of federal power to enact laws prohibiting criticism of
the government).
2. As an example, foundational disagreements over whether to interpret the
First Amendment using an egalitarian or a libertarian approach bitterly divided
the country after the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310, 365 (2010), which overturned federal campaign finance reform laws limiting
expenditures on political speech. See Kathleen Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of
Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 143–45 (2010) (discussing egalitarian and libertarian conceptions of freedom of speech that controlled dissenting and majority
views in Citizens United). Further, in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2487 (2018), the dissenting judges
accused the majority of undermining our democracy when the majority held that
the First Amendment prohibits public sector unions from requiring that employees pay mandatory union dues to support collective bargaining. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at
2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The majority overthrows a decision entrenched in
this Nation’s law—and in its economic life—for over 40 years. . . . And it does so
by weaponizing the First Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now and in
the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory policy.”).
3. See Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687,
697–702 (2016) (detailing scholars’ proposals to harmonize First Amendment doctrine with the regulation of violent video games, Internet speech that harms
marginalized groups, and tortious speech).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”).
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specialness of speech while allowing conduct to be regulated.5 Additionally, when speech causes particular types of harms—such as fraud or
reputational harm—courts allow these harms to also be regulated either
by balancing tort law with First Amendment protections or presuming that
the First Amendment does not extend to the type of harm at issue.6
Indeed, there is an unstated spectrum that prioritizes certain harms
caused by speech over other types of harms when determining the scope
of First Amendment protection. Harms that affect bodily autonomy are
least likely to raise First Amendment concerns, followed by harms to concrete, economic interests such as harm to reputation.7 Harms related to
privacy and, finally, emotional and dignitary interests are most likely to
raise First Amendment concerns, and the regulation of these harms, when
caused by speech, is least likely to survive constitutional scrutiny.8 Many
scholars find this spectrum dissatisfying or wish to add new exceptions to
the First Amendment’s sphere of protection.9
In this Article, I validate current free speech doctrine—and its spectrum of prioritizing harms in the First Amendment calculus—by using a
methodology that also clarifies the jurisprudence, safeguards strong free
5. Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the SpeechConduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 855 (2012) (“Because the Free Speech
Clause confers special protection on speech, First Amendment jurisprudence is
said to ‘draw vital distinctions between words and deeds, between ideas and conduct.’ ” (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002))). The
speech–conduct distinction is unsatisfying at the margins, however, and many
scholars think the distinction is a false construct. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized
Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 63 (1981) (“[N]one of the decisions turning
on the speech-conduct distinction have articulated a convincing conceptual basis
for the lines drawn.”).
6. Frederick Schauer has advanced a helpful framework for articulating when
certain regulations that affect speech are not invalidated by the First Amendment.
In some areas, the First Amendment does not even cover the regulation at issue—
even though speech is implicated. Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of
First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1617–18 (2015). Examples
of this lack of First Amendment “coverage” include “laws dealing with contracts,
wills, trusts, gambling, warranties, and fraud [which] all involve legal regimes that
specify consequences, including negative ones, for using certain words—speech—
in certain ways, but routinely present no First Amendment issues whatsoever.” Id.
at 1619. In other situations, the First Amendment is applied to the regulation at
issue, but the regulation still withstands constitutional scrutiny. In these cases,
there is First Amendment coverage, but no First Amendment “protection.” Id. at
1618–19. Examples of this include regulations that are upheld even though the
Court applies strict or intermediate scrutiny to an area covered by the First Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding prohibition on burning draft cards after applying intermediate scrutiny to the regulation
of what the Supreme Court considered “expressive conduct”).
7. See infra Part II.
8. Id.
9. See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 701 (“Within only the last few years, there
have been calls for greater regulation of speech that causes harm in its provision of
both true factual details and lies, with scholars arguing that these forms of speech
are not beneficial.” (footnotes omitted)).
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speech protections, and illuminates the way forward. This Article advances a method for justifying and clarifying current free speech doctrine
by using the common law as a baseline against which to measure potential
violations to the freedom of speech.10
I argue that courts should treat the common law as it existed at the
time of the First and Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification as a baseline
for determining which harms can be regulated in the face of free speech
challenges. Additionally, “common law baselines”11 can clarify when the
First Amendment affords citizens negative versus positive rights, thus helping to resolve the conflict over whether the First Amendment should be
viewed as primarily egalitarian or libertarian. Although the prevailing
scholarly wisdom is that our current First Amendment jurisprudence has
strayed quite far from the original meaning of the text or the intentions of
the Framers,12 incorporating common law baselines into our understand10. Baselines are set positions against which to measure losses or gains, or in
this context, to measure whether the state has abridged the freedom of speech.
For a fuller exposition of baseline problems in First Amendment doctrine, see infra
Section I.A.
11. By common law, I mean judge-created law that emerged over centuries
that the Framers inherited from English common law traditions. This Article takes
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England as the primary articulation of the
common law as it existed at the time of the First Amendment’s ratification, but also
incorporates judicial decisions, concepts of natural rights, and philosophical understandings of free speech that existed at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra Part I. By common law baselines, I mean the default
background legal rights and duties against which courts assess regulatory deviations to determine whether a First Amendment violation has occurred. I further
explain baselines and baseline problems infra in Section I.A.
12. Most scholars believe modern First Amendment doctrine, with its robust
speech protections extending far beyond the prohibition of prior restraints, was
first developed by the Supreme Court after World War I. See, e.g., David Rabbant,
The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514, 516 (1981) (“Contemporary scholars of the free speech clause of the First Amendment generally trace its
modern development from the Espionage Act . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also
Jeremy Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV.
1915, 1925–28 (2017) (beginning analysis of robust, judge-made, libertarian-style
free speech protections in the 1930s). Leonard Levy, for example, provides a detailed history in support of the view that a civil libertarian conception of the First
Amendment departs dramatically from how citizens of both England and America
viewed free speech rights, and that this conception was not prevalent among lawyers or laypeople until after the ratification of the Bill of Rights. See LEONARD W.
LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (Harper Torchbook ed. 1963) [hereinafter LEVY, LEGACY]. Levy later revised this account, to acknowledge that free speech flourished in practice more
than the doctrine or even free speech theory predicted, due in part to the limited
number of actual prosecutions, but his basic account remained the same. See LEONARD LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS ix–xii (Oxford Univ. Press 1985) [hereinafter LEVY, EMERGENCE]. Some scholars also believe that much of our modern
jurisprudence has been “invented,” and they claim that jurists pretend its roots are
historical. See, e.g., Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 2166, 2168 (2015) (arguing that “low-value” categories of speech, which
receive little to no protection in modern First Amendment doctrine, were afforded
protection at the time of the Constitution’s founding). According to Professor
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ing of the freedom of speech lends coherence to the doctrine and solidifies the doctrine’s approach to both positive and negative First
Amendment rights.
Without some baseline against which to understand First Amendment
rights, the evidence of what the Framers meant by, or what the people at
the time of the Founding understood “the freedom of speech” to mean, is
ambiguous and scarce.13 As an example, scholars disagree on whether the
Framers intended the First Amendment to override the common law
crime of seditious libel.14 Very little debate on the meaning of “the freedom of speech” can be found either in Congress or in the state ratification
conventions.15 This is, in part, due to the fact that James Madison, who
Lakier, “[i]t was only in the New Deal period that courts began to link constitutional protection to a judgment of the value of different kinds of speech.” Id. The
few cases that explicitly analyzed free speech issues at the Supreme Court prior to
the First Amendment’s incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in 1925 generally limited free speech protections to prohibitions on
prior restraints. See, e.g., Rabbant, supra, at 522–28 (citing, among other cases,
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)).
13. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (Wolters Kluwer 2019)
(“There is relatively little that can be discerned as to the drafters’ views other than
their desire to prohibit prior restraints, such as the licensing scheme, and their
rejection of the crime of seditious libel.”); LEVY, LEGACY, supra note 12, at 4 (“We
know very little, though, about the original understanding of the First Amendment’s provision that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . . . .’ ” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I)); RODNEY A. SMOLLA
& MELVILLE B. NIMMER, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.2 (1996)
(contending that various factors, including the Framers’ thoughts being in flux
and often contradicting each other, make “[d]iscerning the original meaning of
the First Amendment . . . a frustrating exercise”). According to Levy, “[t]he
sources, particularly for the period 1787–1791, are unfortunately almost silent on
the matter under inquiry,” in part because the concept of “the freedom of speech”
developed as an “offshoot of freedom of the press . . . virtually . . . without basis in
everyday experience and nearly unknown to legal and constitutional history or to
libertarian thought on either side of the Atlantic prior to the First Amendment.”
LEVY, LEGACY, supra note 12, at 5. Levy’s book, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION, is an answer to the scholarship of Zechariah Chafee, who argued that the First Amendment enshrined a broad, libertarian conception of “the freedom of speech” that
prohibited far more government regulation than simply prior restraints. See
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (Oxford Univ. Press,
6th ed. 1941) (“[I]n the years before the First Amendment freedom of speech was
conceived as giving a wide and genuine protection for all sorts of discussion of
public matters.”).
14. Compare LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 12, at xii (“I still aim to demolish the
proposition formerly accepted in both law and history that it was the intent of the
American Revolution or the Framers of the First Amendment to abolish the common law of seditious libel.”), with CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 4 (“There is thus
little doubt that the First Amendment was meant to prohibit licensing of publication such as existed in England and to forbid punishment for seditious libel.”).
15. The main disagreement at the time was whether these Amendments
should be explicitly articulated, not what they meant. See District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598 (2008) (“The debate with respect to the right to keep
and bear arms, as with other guarantees in the Bill of Rights, was not over whether
it was desirable (all agreed that it was) but over whether it needed to be codified in
the Constitution.”).
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authored the first ten amendments, was mostly concerned with creating
consensus, and states already provided free speech guarantees in their
state constitutions.16 But background conceptions of law at the time, such
as the common law and natural rights systems, can help us make sense of
the freedom of speech.
A common law approach to the First Amendment is supported by the
text and structure of the Constitution. The combination of the First and
Ninth Amendments demonstrates that common law baselines, in conjunction with an understanding of natural rights that existed at the Founding,
should set the baselines for our interpretation of “the freedom of speech.”
The Ninth Amendment requires that background rights not be disparaged
by the existence of enumerated rights. These rights allude to a system of
common law duties and natural rights that formed the cultural and intellectual lenses through which Americans understood their rights. Most
Americans at the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights were steeped
in an understanding of the common law, especially as articulated in William Blackstone’s widely read Commentaries on the Laws of England, and natural rights were the predominant philosophy by which Americans
understood their rights and the obligations of a government.17 Incorporating common law baselines, as modified by natural rights, into free
speech jurisprudence better aligns our current doctrine with the original
meaning of “the freedom of speech.”
In addition to being justified by the text of the Constitution and the
historical context in which it was written, an approach that explicitly recognizes common law baselines is normatively desirable. For one, many
aspects of our current doctrine, including its protection of speech rights
over most dignitary interests and its allocation of positive and negative
rights, already harmonizes with the common law as it existed at the time of
the Bill of Rights’ ratification. Our current doctrine is actually a neat compromise between competing views of the First Amendment’s original
16. The Federalists, for example, initially did not want a bill of rights included
because they deemed it “unnecessary” and even “dangerous”; enumerating rights
like the freedom of speech might lead some to infer either (1) that the federal
government had the power to regulate speech in the first place, or (2) that only
enumerated rights were retained by the people. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84
(Alexander Hamilton) (“Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the
press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be
imposed? I will not contend that such a provision would confer a regulating
power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible
pretense for claiming that power.”). Much of the original ratification debates
about freedom of the press, for example, centered on whether it needed to be
enumerated at all. See, e.g., RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES:
DELAWARE, NEW JERSEY, GEORGIA, CONNECTICUT 490 (Merrill Jensen ed. 1978),
http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx
?type=turn&entity=history.DHRCv3.p0494&id=history.DHRCv3&isize=M [https://
perma.cc/85Z2-Q7VM] (arguing that there is no need to include liberty of the
press or conscience in the Constitution because “it is enough that Congress have
no power to prohibit either”).
17. See infra Part II.
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meaning. In addition, incorporation of common law baselines into First
Amendment doctrine will also lend greater clarity, coherence, and neutrality to First Amendment jurisprudence and will help judges understand
which harms should be accounted for in free speech doctrine.
Discussions of the common law are often used in originalist methodologies,18 and some even assume common law has relevance to the original meaning of the First Amendment. But legal scholarship has not yet
fully systematized how and why the common law should be incorporated
into the First Amendment and how it can be useful to retain and clarify its
meaning. Further, Justices and scholars who have discussed common law
baselines often do so to demonstrate why courts should constrict First
Amendment freedoms,19 or to argue that modern courts have rejected a
common law understanding of the First Amendment.20 In contrast, I believe understanding how common law baselines and the original conception of natural rights were understood at the time of the Founding can
justify our current set of expansive First Amendment freedoms. A common law approach does not necessarily mean that only prior restraints on

18. Judges using methodologies consistent with originalism look to the common law to understand a variety of constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2240 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing to common law to support claim that the Fourth Amendment protects property, not privacy); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2013) (Scalia, J.) (citing Blackstone for
the definition of “curtilage,” the area surrounding the home that is considered
part of the home for Fourth Amendment purposes); Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (using
Blackstone to support holding that the Second Amendment, while protecting an
individual right to keep and carry guns, allows the states to restrict guns that are
not in common use). Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller cited to Blackstone to
demonstrate the historical limitation on “dangerous and unusual weapons,” which
supported Heller’s holding that weapons not “in common use at the time” can be
restricted. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. Of course, Justice Scalia did not mean to restrict
Second Amendment freedoms to guns in common use at the time of the Founding, but instead safeguarded guns in common use at any given time. Id. at 627–29.
Justice Scalia thus fixed the meaning of the Second Amendment to guns in common use but allowed “common use” to remain a more abstract term, defining a
category of gun with respect to its relationship to the citizenry instead of limiting
specific types of guns. In this Article, I fix the common law duties as they existed at
the time of the framing, because the common law is already a set of abstract rights
and duties without specific factual content. Abstracting any further away and letting the common law evolve as a baseline would render our First Amendment
rights dependent not on changing factual circumstances, but on changing government exercises of power. See infra Section I.C.
19. Justice Thomas, for example, has suggested that the Supreme Court revisit the broad First Amendment protections against the state tort of libel by examining the common law as it existed at the time of the ratification of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. See McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 676 (2019)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari); see also Rabbant, supra note 12,
at 539–40 (demonstrating how the Supreme Court, in early free speech cases, used
the common law as a way to regulate harms injurious to the public welfare).
20. Cf. SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 1.5 (showing courts’ usage of
the Blackstone to limit free speech rights to rights against prior restraint).
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speech are forbidden.21 Looking to common law baselines can take us far
in explaining our current set of First Amendment doctrines and practices.
Because using common law baselines can create coherent First
Amendment doctrine and accords with precedent, this approach is normatively desirable regardless of one’s theory of constitutional interpretation. This Article should appeal to originalists from a variety of disciplines
within originalism, but one does not have to be an originalist to accept my
proposal.22 Thinking through the relationship of common law to free
speech helps us understand why certain harms override free speech protections and others do not; thus, thinking about the First Amendment’s
interactions with common law baselines will help make sense of the doctrine for non-originalists as well.
In Part I of this Article, I first explain the major First Amendment
baseline problems. I discuss how disputes over baselines concerning the
state action doctrine and our understanding of which speech harms can
be regulated have contributed to some of the greatest divisions in understanding free speech doctrine. In Part II, I argue that common law baselines, as modified by natural rights, should be incorporated into First
Amendment jurisprudence. I first use the structure of the Constitution to
21. The common law relating to prior restraints is likely more relevant to the
First Amendment’s articulation of freedom of the press than its provision for freedom of speech. See Adam Griffin, First Amendment Originalism: An Original Law and
Theory of Legal Change as Applied to the Freedom of Speech and of the Press, 17 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 91, 93, 94 (2019) (distinguishing freedom of speech, which
“springs from the Framers’ conception of the natural rights of speaking, writing,
and publishing,” from freedom of the press, a positive right “derived from the common law, which carries with it certain established customary legal rules about what
government can and cannot do in regards to regulating the press”); see also infra
Section III.A.
22. My proposal would especially appeal to “original public meaning”
originalists because I demonstrate that the common law was understood by ordinary Americans to set a baseline for understanding our legal rights. Randy Barnett, a leading theorist of original public meaning originalism, describes the
original meaning of text as the meaning “that a reasonable listener would place on
the words used in the constitutional provision at the time of its enactment.” Randy
E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 621 (1999). My
proposal also fits within the broader category of “new originalism” because I will
distinguish between interpretation and construction. See infra Part III. Larry Solum, a pioneer of the distinction between interpretation and construction, describes all new originalists, whether they focus on original public meaning of the
text or the Framers’ original intent, as converging on the views that (1) the text
has a fixed meaning that should (2) constrain judges, and (3) that constitutional
interpretation, which determines the meaning of a text, is different than constitutional construction, the act of giving that meaning legal force via doctrine or legal
opinion. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 456–57 (2013). Many schools of originalism, including
those that focus on Framers’ intent and those that focus on the methods the Framers used to interpret the Constitution, will find my analysis supported by their theories. For a more comprehensive summary of the different schools of originalism
and the trajectory of the development of originalist theory, see LEE J. STRANG,
ORIGINALISM’S PROMISE 9–42 (2019).
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argue for the incorporation of common law baselines. I then explore why
Founding-era understandings of natural rights should inform our understanding of these baselines, and why the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment should not greatly modify our sense of common law
baselines.
Finally, in Part III, I demonstrate how modern First Amendment jurisprudence is compatible with the original understanding of “the freedom
of speech” as incorporating the common law and natural rights. I contend
that both our understanding of the treatment of harms and our analysis of
when free speech doctrine provides positive versus negative rights is consistent with incorporating common law baselines into our understanding
of the First Amendment. I also discuss areas where, at first blush, current
free speech doctrine appears inconsistent with doctrine based on common
law baselines, and I argue that these apparent inconsistencies can be reconciled. I close with a discussion of what my approach means for current,
contested free speech issues, including how antidiscrimination harms
should be treated when they affect free speech rights, and how courts
should conceptualize harms-balancing more generally.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S BASELINE PROBLEM
Baseline problems are common in many areas of the law.23 A baseline problem exists when there is no definitive, default position against
which to measure deviations, creating difficulty determining when particular actions are legally problematic.24 Another way of articulating this
problem is that there is no “neutral” position from which to measure
harms or gains, so an action can be construed as either the denial of a
benefit or an imposition of a penalty.25 For example, in the Establishment
Clause context, there is no set baseline for the degree to which religion is
constitutionally acceptable in public life. As a result, if the baseline is considered to be one of the complete absence of endorsement of religion by
23. Baseline problems pervade legal analysis in areas as wide ranging as copyright infringement, civil rights claims, and income taxation of employee benefits.
See, e.g., Kevin J. Hickey, Reframing Similarity Analysis in Copyright, 93 WASH. U. L.
REV. 681, 686 (2016); Herman H. Johnson, Jr., Disambiguating the Disparate Impact
Claim, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 433, 446 (2013); Note, Federal Income
Taxation of Employee Fringe Benefits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1141, 1147–48 (1976).
24. See, e.g., Hickey, supra note 23 (analyzing baseline debacle in context of
infringement, and stating courts struggle over whether to use original copyrightable work as baseline or alleged infringer’s work).
25. According to Emily Sherwin and Maimon Schwarzschild, the baseline
problem exists because
[g]ains and losses must be defined in reference to some state of affairs
that serves as a neutral, or “baseline,” position. Only with the aid of this
baseline can we describe some events as harms and some as benefits.
Thus if A is legally entitled to an object, B’s use of it is a benefit to B. If B
is entitled to the object, A’s withholding it is a harm to B.
Emily Sherwin & Maimon Schwarzschild, Epstein and Levmore: Objections from the
Right, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451, 1452–53 (1995).
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the government, a city’s display of a picture of the Ten Commandments in
a courthouse would be viewed as benefitting religion, perhaps violating
the Establishment Clause.26 Alternatively, if some amount of religiosity
may be recognized by the state as a neutral baseline, erecting a Ten Commandments statue might not be an Establishment Clause problem,27 and
forcing the state to remove the monument evidences hostility towards religion. People can view a court’s decision to remove religious monuments
as either creating a harm to religion or simply eliminating an impermissible benefit to religion.
In the free speech context, baseline problems are responsible for a
good deal of the divide in individuals’ approaches to the scope of free
speech rights. This Part explores how the baseline problems involving the
state action doctrine and the regulation of harms caused by speech contribute to our discord in interpreting the First Amendment.
A.

State Action Baselines

A fundamental divide exists between those who wish the First Amendment to be more egalitarian and those who wish the First Amendment to
be more libertarian.28 This divide often reduces to a discussion about
baselines involving when the state can and should act with respect to free
speech rights. Free speech libertarians maintain that any state intervention to affect the marketplace of ideas is a First Amendment concern; the
First Amendment’s state action component proscribes government abridgement of speech that necessitates an omission/commission distinction
preventing government action.29 Those with a more egalitarian approach
to free speech doctrine believe the government has a role to play in equalizing speech opportunities, such that the government can and should intervene to protect private parties from abridging each other’s speech, and,
in doing so, may affect the marketplace of ideas.30
26. See McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860
(2005) (“When the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose
of advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of official
religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government’s ostensible
object is to take sides.”).
27. Id. at 886–89 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the history and practice
of our nation demonstrate that the government need not remain neutral with respect to religion over non-religion).
28. See Sullivan, supra note 2.
29. For a discussion of these differences and how they affect partisan divisions, see Goldberg, supra note 3.
30. Government regulation of social media platforms is an area currently
targeted by many scholars, but they must contend with our currently libertarian
understanding of free speech. See, e.g., Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content
Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1366 (2018) (“To enforce the First Amendment
against online platforms, the courts would have to relax the state action doctrine as
applied to speech—or at least speech occurring on privately owned online platforms. Such a transformation in the law is not completely unthinkable, but it is
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Some with the egalitarian approach believe that the “state action doctrine,” which limits constitutional scrutiny to government intervention, is
an unworkable and undesirable legal fiction because the government has
already “acted” to protect property, contract, and other common law
rights—and these alter the distribution of speech opportunities.31 Thus,
there is not a neutral baseline against which the government acts when it
restricts speech. When the government protects property rights, the argument goes, the wealthy and privileged have more opportunities for speaking, and thus the government is acting to influence speech opportunities.
Many who wish free speech doctrine to be more egalitarian would undo
the fundamental omission/commission, state action distinction that currently pervades First Amendment jurisprudence, rendering most government action that targets speech, especially based on content,
impermissible. Egalitarian free speech supporters also wish to see some
affirmative obligations placed on government—or at least constitutionally
permitted—to equalize speaking opportunities.32
Indeed, many legal realists argue that common law baselines should
have been discarded with the repudiation of the anti-canonical Lochner v.
New York.33 They believe that legal baselines, and especially common law
baselines, are not natural or pre-political, but instead are rights and duties
defined and provided by government. As such, the distribution of wealth,
property, and opportunities, including opportunities for speech, that occurs as a result of the enforcement of common law rights and duties can
and should be altered without assuming some deviation from the common
law baseline.34 Cass Sunstein, for example, argues against the remnants of
nearly so, and it is hard to imagine it occurring at any point in the foreseeable
future.”).
31. According to Professors Gary Peller and Mark Tusnet, who criticize the
analytic incoherence of the state action doctrine,
application of the state action doctrine to the identification of burdens
on free speech assumes that free speech opportunities exist in the social
field to such a degree that one can conclude that democratic self-governance exists, as long as the legislature has not “affirmatively” acted to restrict such opportunities—but merely “tolerates” restrictions that arise
from the background rules of property and contract.
Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. L.J.
779, 794 (2004).
32. For a thorough and provocative discussion of the problems with a formalistic approach to the First Amendment and the state action doctrine, see Jack
Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment,
39 DUKE L.J. 375 (1990).
33. See Peller & Tusnet, supra note 31, at 794 “(finding “[i]n its evaluation of
free speech . . . the judiciary limits itself to a Lochnerian concept that people have
free speech liberty unless the state has burdened free speech through affirmative
governmental acts. The effects of background entitlements on the exercise of free
speech rights are immunized from constitutional challenge,” alluding to Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) invalidating maximum hours law for bakers on economic substantive due proves grounds).
34. According to Mila Sohini, prominent politicians, including Senator Elizabeth Warren and President Barack Obama, have questioned the sentiment that we
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Lochner that still exist in today’s legal doctrine, particularly the idea that
“[g]overnmental intervention was constitutionally troublesome, whereas
inaction was not; and both neutrality and inaction were defined as respect
for the behavior of private actors pursuant to the common law, in light of
the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements.”35
However problematic, baselines are necessary for giving meaning to
the protections the First Amendment affords to “the freedom of speech”
mentioned in the First Amendment. Baselines are necessary for applying
the state action doctrine, or, in the absence of a state action doctrine, for
determining when our free speech rights have been violated. Perhaps the
state action doctrine’s problem—that the state has always acted to some
degree in every aspect of our interactions—is solved by simply claiming
that the First Amendment is implicated only when the state intervenes with
respect to speech. This approach, which is the approach of our current
constitutional doctrine, however, does not satisfy those who wish to undo
the state action doctrine entirely. Using this approach (where the First
Amendment is implicated only when a state intervenes) does not allow the
government to intervene in the marketplace of ideas to protect or redistribute free speech rights. It also prevents the government from remedying the effects of the state’s creation and enforcement of background
rights in property, tort, and contract—i.e., common law rights and duties.
Despite its problems, preserving the state action doctrine is critical to
protecting the coherence of First Amendment doctrine. Without it, private individuals would also be required to honor the dictates of the Free
Speech Clause. But forcing private individuals to respect the free speech
rights of others infringes on the speech and associational rights of those
private individuals. If Person A wants to have a newspaper that advances
Green Party ideals, Person A should be able to discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint in the selection of op-eds without violating the First Amendment. If a Giants fan asks a Patriots fan to leave the Giants fan’s home
because of the Patriots fan’s support of the New England football
franchise, the government must honor the Giants fan’s property rights
(that abridge the Patriots fan’s speech) without violating the First Amendment, or the Giants Fan’s speech and associational rights will be compromised. Thus, we cannot do away with the state action doctrine entirely.
are not responsible for each other, and that successful individuals have achieved
their lots without government assistance or intervention, but the Trump administration aimed to revise ideas about neutrality and common law baselines. See Mila
Sohini, The Trump Administration and the Law of the Lochner Era, 107 GEO. L.J. 1323
(2019) (“That individuals should be left alone to pursue their private interests;
that an unregulated market is both neutral and natural; that people should be
responsible for their own fates rather than reliant on the state to protect them
from their shortcomings or their free choices; that redistributive measures are suspect because they take away what people have earned fair and square . . . these are
all ideas that continue to possess an immense amount of intuitive appeal and political clout.”).
35. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987).
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The First Amendment must apply only to state actors, and we must find
some way to determine when the government cannot, can, or must act
without violating the First Amendment. We need a coherent baseline for
determining when the state has acted that also resolves whether the state
can sometimes act to protect private parties from each other. The common law can provide this baseline, against which to apply the state action
doctrine, and can create some affirmative obligations for the state.36
B.

Harm Baselines

In order to preserve the specialness of the freedom of speech and
distinguish it from conduct, speech must be distinguished from conduct
and cannot be restricted every time it causes harm. However, courts also
cannot entirely ignore the harms caused by speech and invalidate all restrictions on expression, no matter how harmful the speech. Many scholars propose balancing the harms caused by particular speech against its
virtues, but this approach—if applied across the board—would lend increased unpredictability to free speech doctrine and lead to the chilling
effect of self-censorship. Creating baselines around which tortious harms
can be regulated without interfering with the freedom of speech can help
resolve many current free speech debates.
Courts have solved this problem by applying a largely categorical approach to the First Amendment but building in a certain amount of
harms-balancing when the speech causes tortious harm. Even this harmsbalancing prioritizes some categories of harms that conflict with free
speech rights. In other words, certain types of harms are categorically
more or less regulable when the regulation of these harms interferes with
speech. Where speech creates tortious harm, the Supreme Court has also
crafted doctrines that reflect a desire to protect speech more when the
speech is in “the public interest”37 or when the speaker suing is a “public
figure.”38 The end result is a spectrum that safeguards some speech
harms against regulation whereas others can be more easily regulated.
At one extreme, when speech causes purely emotional injury, if the
speech involves a matter of public concern, a plaintiff cannot recover, no
matter how “outrageous” the injury.39 Similarly, when speech implicates
36. See infra Part III.
37. The First Amendment protections that intersect with both defamation law
and the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress use this standard.
38. In defamation law, the Supreme Court has created a system where public
figures must meet a higher bar before they can sue for injury to their reputations.
This reflects the idea that public figures have thrust themselves into the public eye
and can more easily resort to self-help methods of remedying false speech with
true speech and thus should not use the more censorious method of litigation to
preserve their reputations. See Wolston v. Reader’s Digest, 443 U.S. 157, 164
(1979).
39. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (overturning civil damages
award for intentional infliction of emotional distress against religious group that
protests at the military funeral of plaintiff’s son). The Supreme Court has not yet
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privacy concerns, a plaintiff cannot recover if the speech was newsworthy,40 even if the speech was originally illegally obtained (but innocently published by the newspaper).41 For false speech that impacts
reputational concerns, however, a plaintiff who is a public figure can recover by showing “actual malice.”42 As a result, reputation is protected
more than other types of dignitary concerns. And, at the other end of the
spectrum of regulable speech, speech that threatens bodily injury is categorically unprotected by the First Amendment.43
Although some amount of balancing of harms in First Amendment
jurisprudence is inevitable, a mostly categorical approach that limits both
harms-balancing and the number of newly created unprotected categories
is the best way to facilitate the predictability required to promote a broad
array of robust speech rights.44 I have previously established a framework
for approaching free speech cases that limits the unpredictability of
harms-balancing by arguing that only the harms caused by speech resembling “conduct-type harms” should be accounted for whenever harms-balancing is performed in free speech jurisprudence.45 By regulating only
the conduct-type harms caused by speech, courts can safeguard what
makes speech special while preventing compensation of certain harms
caused by speech.46 Under this approach, “revenge pornography” can be
regulated even in cases where the publisher has acquired the pornography
resolved whether plaintiffs suing for speech on a purely private matter may recover
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
40. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533–34 (1989) (holding that newspaper
who read rape victim’s name off a police report cannot be sued for publishing the
name, despite victim’s privacy concerns).
41. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (“[P]rivacy concerns
give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance.”). Bartnicki held that a radio’s broadcasting of an illegally intercepted
phone call was protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 535.
42. The actual malice standard requires a public figure plaintiff to demonstrate that defendant’s defamatory publication was intentionally false or published
with reckless disregard for the truth. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280–81
(1964). A private figure plaintiff must demonstrate at least negligence with respect
to the truth. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
43. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (holding that states may ban
“true threats,” which “encompass those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals”).
44. See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 721–22.
45. Id. at 721 (“Courts should engage in balancing speech harms against the
benefits of speech only where those harms are analogous to harms that flow from
conduct, based on the properties that distinguish classic instances of speech (such
as political satire or protest) from paradigmatic cases of conduct (such as battery
or theft).”).
46. Id. at 695 (“[I]nstead of subjecting all speech to consequentialist balancing, courts should allow a weighing of costs and benefits only of the harms more
similar to conduct than classic speech. Because of our constitutional and cultural
commitment to free speech, speech should be defined in a way that preserves its
specialness, and some harms caused by speech simply cannot be remedied.”).
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legally, but only in cases where the harms of publication are closely analogous to a conduct harm—breach of contract.47 This would be the case if
there was an explicit or implied promise that sexually explicit content
would not be shared with others. In cases where the harms from speech
are emblematic of classic speech harms—such as where the harm is context-dependent, the listener’s harm can be mediated almost entirely
through the listener’s own mind, and the harms are intertwined with the
benefits of the speech—those harms cannot be addressed through
regulation.48
This proposal, however, begs the question of why certain harms (such
as breach of contract) are considered conduct-type harms, even when
caused by speech, such that their regulation can be harmonized with protecting speech. This presents a baseline problem because, under my proposal, the state may prevent the harms that are not speech-like, but we still
must define conduct-type harms to create a neutral baseline. This baseline problem, created by tension between the inevitability of harms-balancing and the necessity of preserving the specialness of speech, requires
establishing why certain types of harms lead to an absence of First Amendment coverage or decreased First Amendment protection.49 The common law torts can solve this problem; the common law has formed a type
of baseline against which to measure whether the First Amendment is implicated, but this baseline and its organization of harms must be justified.
In the next Part, I will argue that the Ninth Amendment provides a
way to solve the First Amendment’s baseline problems by incorporating
the common law, modified by an understanding of natural rights, as a
baseline for determining when state action abridges the freedom of
speech and how the First Amendment should interact with the harms
caused by speech. Although some argue that Lochner’s repudiation should
mean that common law baselines should be less prevalent in free speech
doctrine,50 common law baselines are justified by the Constitution’s text
and structure.
II. THE HISTORICAL

AND

TEXTUAL CASES

FOR

COMMON LAW BASELINES

Arguments based on the history, text, and structure of the Constitution support a fairly comprehensive incorporation of the common law as a
baseline for determining the structure of free speech rights. This Part
demonstrates why the common law as it existed at the time of the ratification of the First Amendment, in conjunction with an understanding of
natural rights principles, can solve the baseline problems that yield diver47. Id. at 743–49.
48. See id. at 722–23.
49. See Schauer, supra note 6 (addressing the distinction between coverage
and protection).
50. See Sunstein, supra note 35, at 914–15 (noting where “Lochner-like premises in first amendment doctrine” have led to incorrect or unjust outcomes).
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gent and divisive approaches to the First Amendment. This Part also notes
why the Fourteenth Amendment should generally not change the way we
incorporate common law baselines and natural rights into First Amendment doctrine.
A.

The Common Law Understanding of Rights

The Framers understood our rights as “[d]escending from natural
rights philosophy and stemming from the common law tradition.”51 To
some extent, the common law defined the scope of natural rights. Because both the common law and ideas about natural rights formed the
intellectual backdrop against which the Framers created the Constitution,
their interaction contributes to a thorough understanding of the First
Amendment. The Ninth Amendment’s guidance suggests that the interaction of the common law and natural rights should be considered when
interpreting the First Amendment.
The reference point for the common law as a First Amendment baseline should be fixed at the time it existed at the First Amendment’s ratification—later incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, in order to
provide the appropriate baseline for interpreting the original meaning of
“the freedom of speech.” Although the common law has never been unitary,52 it had many commonalities across the colonies and with England at
the time of the First Amendment’s ratification. Further, although one virtue of the common law is that it evolves to fit institutions,53 adapting constitutional meaning as the common law evolves would leave our
fundamental free speech rights vulnerable to constant judicial re-examination, erosion, and manipulation. Instead, the common law as of the
Founding provides a useful baseline floor for understanding our free
speech rights, whether one takes an original understanding of the First
Amendment or whether one believes constitutional meaning can evolve
over time.
As noted above, the original meaning of “the freedom of speech” is
murky, in part because “Americans . . . rarely ever used the term.”54 How51. Griffin, supra note 21, at 101.
52. See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 551, 556 (2007) (“Even when viewed with the originalist’s spotlight on specific
doctrines, the common law was far from a unified field at the time of the Founding, nor was it so conceived, as both the writings of the Founders themselves and
contemporaneous legal commentary demonstrate.”).
53. Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 324, 382 (2006) (“As for change, the common law, while an identifiable
body of customs and rules, was not a static body of customs and rules. New customs developed to meet new situations. In keeping with this principle, James Kent
explained that while settlers had taken the English common law with them to
America, it was retained only ‘so far as it was adapted to our institutions and circumstances.’ ” (quoting 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *343
(O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 12th ed. 1873) (1826))).
54. Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246,
251 (2017).
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ever, this Section demonstrates that there is clear evidence that Americans
accepted the common law as a framework for understanding the law and
that the Framers were steeped in a natural rights tradition. When looking
to import common law baselines into understandings of the freedom of
speech, the most comprehensive articulation of the common law as it existed at the time of the Founding is Blackstone’s Commentaries, in addition
to early courts’ common law decisions.
Some argue that the First Amendment was intended to override the
common law as articulated by Blackstone, especially the proposition that
freedom of the press consists solely in laying no previous restraints on the
press and that seditious libel may be criminalized. Debates over the Alien
and Sedition Act support both sides of this proposition.55 Instead of incorporating or abandoning the common law wholesale, therefore, this
Section contends that Blackstone’s articulation of the common law should
be qualified, to some degree, by the natural rights framework as understood by the Framers and ordinary Americans. The distinction between
freedom of speech and freedom of the press, both of which were articulated in the First Amendment, further underscores the idea that natural
rights to freedom of speech added more liberties to the common law understanding of freedom of the press.
1.

Blackstone Sets the Common Law Standard

Most Americans, at the time of the ratification of the First Amendment, “viewed their rights as based on traditional English law.”56 Although there are several authoritative sources on the common law as it
existed at the time of the First Amendment’s drafting and ratification,
Blackstone’s four volumes of Commentaries, the first edition of which was
published between 1765 and 1769, provides a primary resource for understanding the common law rights and duties as understood by the Framers
and ordinary Americans.
Blackstone’s Commentaries articulated the rights and duties of British
citizens and provided a particular approach to adjudicating those rights
and duties. Each book covers a particular subject. Book One covers the
rights of persons; Book Two explores property and title; Books Three and
Four discuss private and public wrongs, respectively, or ways to infringe
the rights outlined in the first two books, as against an individual (private
wrongs) and as against the community (public wrongs, or crimes).
Blackstone’s Commentaries were very popular in the colonies, perhaps
more popular than in England.57 They were readily accessible and could
be understood by intelligent laymen.58 “Partly because the Commentaries
55.
56.
Baseline
(2010).
57.
58.

See supra Introduction.
Jeffrey D. Jackson, Blackstone’s Ninth Amendment: A Historical Common Law
for the Interpretation of Unenumerated Rights, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 167, 200
Id. at 202.
Id. at 201–02.
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were more accessible to Americans than were other published sources of
law, ‘[a]ll of our formative documents—the Declaration of Independence,
the Constitution, the Federalist Papers, and the seminal decisions of the
Supreme Court under John Marshall—were drafted by attorneys steeped
in [Blackstone’s Commentaries].’”59
Blackstone’s exposition of the common law was not without its detractors. Blackstone himself disputed the notion that the colonists had rights
granted by the common law60 and believed in the doctrine of “parliamentary supremacy” over common law rights.61 However, the colonists believed they were due the rights provided by the common law as articulated
by Blackstone.62 Perhaps because a more diverse variety of legal sources
were available in England than in America, “[i]t would be hard to exaggerate the degree of esteem in which . . . the Commentaries were held” in
America.63
As demonstrated later, the interaction of the Ninth Amendment and
the First Amendment counsels in favor of using the common law as a baseline for resolving difficult First Amendment questions. However, importing Blackstone as the primary source of the common law wholesale into
the First Amendment is a controversial—and ultimately too simplistic—
exercise. For one, many believe that the First Amendment was intended
to supersede the common law as articulated by Blackstone, especially the
views that freedom of the press prohibits only prior restraints, and that
truth is not a defense to criminal libel.64
59. Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996)
(alterations in original) (quoting ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 11 (1984)).
60. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *108; see also id. at *107 (“But
in conquered or ceded countries, that have already laws of their own, the king may
indeed alter and change those laws; but, till he does actually change them, the
ancient laws of the country remain, unless such as are against the law of God, as in
the case of an infidel country.” (footnote omitted)).
61. Parliamentary supremacy, which would recognize parliamentary authority
over the common law, was an ascendant doctrine in England at the time of the
framing, and Blackstone’s Commentaries attempted to recognize this doctrine while
elevating a common law system. See Jackson, supra note 56, at 203–04.
62. See id. at 205 (“[I]t is imperative to look at what source gave the public its
ideas of rights. At the time of the framing, those ‘other’ rights [referenced in the
Ninth Amendment] were the rights that the people thought they possessed at common law, and their ideas about the common law came from Blackstone. If what we
are searching for is the original common meaning of unenumerated rights, then
Blackstone is the place to start.”).
63. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 23 (1991).
64. According to Blackstone,
[i]n a civil action, we may remember, a libel must appear to be false as
well as scandalous; for, if the charge be true, the plaintiff has received no
private injury, and has no ground to demand a compensation . . . therefore, upon a civil action, the truth of the accusation may be pleaded in
bar of the suit. But, in a criminal prosecution, the tendency which all
libels have to create animosities and to disturb the public peace is the
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According to Blackstone, freedom of the press consisted solely in laying no previous restraints on publication.65 Anyone who published statements tending to breach the peace because of their defamatory nature
could be called to account for those statements. Truth was a defense to
civil libel, but not criminal libel, because truthful statements had an even
greater tendency to cause a breach of the peace than false statements.66
Freedom of thought or inquiry also was not stifled by punishing speech
after the fact, because “liberty of private sentiment is still left; the disseminating, or making public of bad sentiments, destructive of the ends of society, is the crime which society corrects.”67
The Framers tended to have a more expansive view of speech rights
than Blackstone’s articulation of freedom of the press. Even the Sedition
Act,68 which James Madison, drafter of the First Amendment, still argued
was unconstitutional (in part as a violation of free speech), allowed truth
as a defense to criminal libel. The Sedition Act criminalized false statements that were injurious to the reputation of the government,69 but, contrary to Blackstone’s articulation of freedom of the press, allowed for truth
as a defense.70 Many early American politicians believed the First Amendment was entirely intended to do away with even “false” seditious libel and
rejected the idea that a government could be defamed.
Thus, although early Americans understood their rights to be emanating from the common law system that existed in England, there is reason
to believe that the common law should not be incorporated wholesale as a
way to understand the First Amendment. If criminal libel laws were intended to protect the monarchy, for example, these laws would not be as
important in a democracy, where unrestricted access to information would
whole that the law considers. And, therefore, in such prosecutions the
only points to be inquired into are, first, the making or publishing of the
book or writing, and secondly, whether the matter be criminal . . . .
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *150–51.
65. Blackstone wrote that,
[t]he liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state;
but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and
not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every
freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before
the public; to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press, but if he
publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity.
Id. at *151–52.
66. Indeed, a common maxim at the time was “the greater the truth, the
greater the libel,” which was attributed to the English judge Lord Mansfield. See
Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation II, 4 COLUM. L.
REV. 33, 44 (1904).
67. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *152.
68. Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
69. Id.
70. The Sedition Act prohibited “any false, scandalous and malicious writing”
against the government or its officials. Id.
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be essential to self-government.71 Further, the conception of natural
rights at the time of the ratification complicated importing the common
law in its entirety into the First Amendment, especially considering the
textually distinct protections for freedom of speech and freedom of the
press.72 A fuller appreciation of these natural rights is necessary to the
endeavor of determining which aspects of the common law should be used
as a First Amendment baseline, and how to understand both freedom of
the press and freedom of speech.
2.

Natural Rights Enrich the Common Law Approach

In some ways, the common law was directly contradicted by the natural rights understanding that existed among “elites”73 at the Founding,
but, in other ways, natural rights and the common law existed in harmony.
Some at the Founding believed that the common law articulated the “positive law”74 scope of our natural rights, or was a mechanism for enforcing
our natural rights, while others believed that the common law was
subordinate to our natural rights.75 Examining the natural rights paradigm enriches and complicates our understanding of how the common
law should be used as a baseline to develop free speech doctrine.
In social compact theory,76 natural rights are those that exist even in
the state of nature, prior to the organization of government.77 A government is not necessary to provide a natural right to bodily autonomy, for
71. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVI23 (2000).
72. Although the conventional view, and the approach taken by the Supreme
Court, is that freedom of speech and freedom of the press are redundant concepts, some scholars have advanced the position that freedom of speech either
arose from the legislative privilege of speech and debate or did not truly exist as an
independent concept at the time of the First Amendment’s ratification. See Campbell, supra note 54, at 249–50 nn.1–9 (citing sources). If freedom of speech is an
independent concept, it would augment notions of freedom of the press, supplying more freedoms.
73. Founding-era elites had a thorough understanding of natural rights, id. at
252, 261, although it is unclear if members of the ordinary public did. In contrast,
Blackstone was read by intelligent laypeople, which may have included more ordinary Americans, but likely not those who were uneducated.
74. Positive law is law that has been enacted by those with authority to do so
and includes statutes and judicial exposition of the common law. See William
Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 1821, 1860–61 (2006). This is distinct from the concept of positive liberties
versus negative liberties. See infra note 131.
75. Campbell, supra note 54, at 290–93 (“Not surprisingly, then, forceful disagreements emerged about the extent to which the common law defined the scope
of natural rights.”).
76. Social compact theory is the view that individuals, when forming a government, agree to give up some freedoms in order to benefit the common good, and
“[t]he social compact’s objects are therefore to protect, order, and facilitate the
right ordering of human freedom.” Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 877, 887.
77. James Madison categorized rights as follows,
LEGE”
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example, or a right to conscience. Speaking, writing, and publishing were
considered natural rights.78 Positive rights,79 by contrast, were those necessarily created by government, such as the right to habeas corpus, and
were “primarily contained in the principles, precepts, and precedents of
the common law,” which also codified some of the natural rights.80 Positive rights secured liberties, and natural rights defined their contours.81
The right to “free presses,” according to Thomas Jefferson when discussing the constitutional amendments, was placed in a category alongside
habeas corpus and the right to trial by jury as one of the “certain fences
which experience has proved peculiarly efficacious against wrong, and
rarely obstructive of right.”82 Jefferson thus likely considered freedom of
the press as a “positive right,”83 distinct from the natural right of speaking,
writing, and publishing.84
Freedom of the press may have been inserted into the First Amendment as a way of securing other natural rights, such as freedom of conscience and freedom of speech.85 Indeed, preventing prior restraints such
as licensing meant that speech would be punished, if at all, after the fact.
As a result, juries had the power to (and did) nullify libel laws and acquit
defendants, even if the truth was not technically a defense to criminal libel
under the common law.86
[o]f rights, some are natural and unalienable, of which even the people
cannot deprive individuals: Some are constitutional or fundamental;
these cannot be altered or abolished by the ordinary laws; . . . and some
are common or mere legal rights, that is, such as individuals claim under
laws which the ordinary legislature may alter or abolish at pleasure.
Griffin, supra note 21, at 101–02, 101 n.46 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Federal Farmer No. 6 (Dec. 25, 1787), in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 979, 983–84 (John
P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2004)).
78. Campbell, supra note 54, at 253.
79. This usage of positive right is slightly different than the usage of positive
liberty as contrasted to negative liberty, see infra note 133, although both positive
rights must be provided by the government.
80. Griffin, supra note 21, at 104.
81. Id.
82. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Noah Webster, Jr. (Dec. 4, 1790), in 18
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 131, 132 (Julian P. Boyd ed. 1971).
83. But see Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American
Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 908–11 (1993) (classifying freedom of the press as
a natural right).
84. Not all Founders considered freedom of the press to be a positive right
instead of a natural right. See Campbell, supra note 54, at 288–90.
85. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Noah Webster, Jr., supra note 82. Jefferson believed freedom of conscience to be part of the “certain portions of right not
necessary to enable them to carry on an effective government, and which experience has nevertheless proved they will be constantly incroaching on, if submitted
to them.” Id.
86. The famous Zenger trial is an example of this. See CURTIS, supra note 71,
at 41. John Peter Zenger was imprisoned for seditious libel for statements made
criticizing William Morris, the Governor of New York. Zenger’s lawyer argued that
truth should be a defense to libel, and although the court did not accept this as a
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By this account, the natural right of freedom of speech would supplement the positive right of freedom of the press. Freedom of speech could
therefore be much more expansive than freedom of the press—which may
have been limited to the notion that prior restraints were prohibited.
However, even states that provided separately for freedom of speech
and freedom of the press allowed speech to be punished after the fact if it
was “abusive.” For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 separated freedom of speech and freedom of the press,87 yet Pennsylvania
courts articulated publishing freedoms as being somewhat consistent
mainly with freedoms against prior restraints, holding that “every citizen
may freely speak write and print on every subject, being responsible for
the abuse of that liberty.”88 Understanding when speech constitutes “the
abuse of that liberty,” then, is important. The natural right to freedom of
speech can help clarify how much the constitutional right to “the freedom
of speech” adds to the restrictions on prior restraints—and the notion that
juries should assess harmful speech, not licensors—contained in the freedom of the press. What this natural right entails will thus add color to our
understanding of our free speech liberties.
Under the prevailing view at the time of the Founding, once a consensual government is formed, some natural rights could be sacrificed to secure the common good, if the people or their legislatures consent.89
Other natural rights were inalienable.90 Freedom of conscience and freedom of religion were generally considered inalienable.91 According to
Professor Jud Campbell, by the end of the eighteenth century, the right
that he describes as the freedom to make “well-intentioned statements of
one’s thoughts” was considered inalienable in the absence of direct injury
to others,92 even if some natural rights involving speaking and publishing
could be regulated for the common good.93 False speech, according to
Campbell, could be restricted and was not part of the inalienable natural
right to expressing oneself.94 Under this view, the Sedition Act, which did
not penalize truthful speech, had problems because it was administered in
matter of law, the jury disregarded the law and invalidated Zenger’s conviction on
the basis of the truth of Zenger’s statements. Albert W. Alshuler & Andrew G.
Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867,
871–74 (1994).
87. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. 12 (“[T]he people have a right to freedom of
speech, and of writing, and publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom of
the press ought not to be restrained.”).
88. Commonwealth v. Davies, 1 Binn. 97, 98 note a (Pa. 1804).
89. Campbell, supra note 54, at 253.
90. Griffin, supra note 21, at 102.
91. Id. at 103.
92. Campbell, supra note 54, at 286.
93. Id. at 253.
94. Id. at 282–83.
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an improperly partisan way, not that it facially infringed upon people’s
natural rights.95
The right to speaking, writing, and publishing, however, may have
even been broader than simply the right to make well-intentioned statements of one’s thoughts. The source of our natural rights was a subject of
disagreement at the Founding, leading to a divergence of views on the
freedom of speech. Federalists generally believed that the common law
articulated our natural rights, while many Republicans wished to look to
common sense and practical experience, which was more speech-protective, leading to a broader understanding of free speech protections.96
Madison argued that “[o]pinions are not the objects of legislation.”97 Additionally, there is also some evidence that Madison did not believe abusive speech, or false speech, should be punished. According to Madison,
punishment for the so-called “abuse” of retained rights, such as “the liberty of speech, and of the press” would be a serious punishment if it fell on
particular people or classes.98 This speaks to a concern about selective
prosecution or targeting of speech in a way that would be unduly
censorious.
Further, unlike Professor Campbell,99 I read some statements by
Thomas Jefferson as perhaps wishing to deny the federal government the
power even to regulate false speech, and leaving the states—who were not
yet subject to the First Amendment—to hold printers liable for false
facts.100 Then, upon incorporation of the First Amendment’s privileges
into the Fourteenth Amendment, the states would also lack the power to
regulate false speech as well. Thomas Jefferson described the original
Constitution as needing a supplementary “declaration of rights” to secure
“the rights of thinking, and publishing our thoughts by speaking or writ95. See id. at 284–86.
96. Id. at 254. This partially explains the disagreement over the Sedition Act.
See id. The speech-protective practical experience and common sentiments of ordinary Americans is discussed in CURTIS, supra note 71. According to Curtis,
“[t]here was a chasm between the orthodox understanding of the right many
judges would apply and the popular right many citizens exercised and thought
they had.” CURTIS, supra note 71, at 3–4.
97. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794) (statement of Rep. James Madison).
Campbell acknowledges that opinions were also within the realm of protection.
98. Id.
99. Campbell, supra note 54, at 281 n.167.
100. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1778), in 13
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 440, 442 (Julian P. Boyd ed. 1956) (“A declaration that the federal government will never restrain the presses from printing any
thing they please, will not take away the liability of the printers for false facts
printed. . . . My idea then, is, that tho’ proper exceptions to these general rules
are desirable and probably practicable, yet if the exceptions cannot be agreed on,
the establishment of the rules in all cases will do ill in very few. I hope therefore a
bill of rights will be formed to guard the people against the federal government, as
they are already guarded against their state governments in most instances.”).
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ing.”101 Rights such as these are “useless to surrender to the government,
and which yet, governments have always been fond to invade.”102 According to Jefferson, “it is better to establish trials by jury, the right of habeas
corpus, freedom of the press and freedom of religion, in all cases, and to
abolish standing armies in time of peace, and monopolies in all cases, than
not to do it in any.”103 Under this reading of Jefferson, the retained right
to freedom of speech meant, at least to some, that a broad swath of
speech, even if it caused abuse, could not be regulated.
On the other hand, the First Amendment may have codified deference to the legislature to determine what was in the common good.
Under this reading, the retained right of speaking—enumerated in the
First Amendment,— could be abridged only if the legislature punished
speech for a reason that was not for the benefit of the public.104 Congress
would then have broad powers to restrict speech, subject mostly to the
positive right against prior restraints enumerated in the Freedom of the
Press Clause. This reading is belied, however, by a common understanding at the time shielding certain types of thoughts and opinions from
regulation.105
The Founders disagreed about which restrictions were in the public
good. Any given restriction could enhance debate by punishing deceptive
speech or restrict debate by chilling too much speech in the process.106
For example, the Framers—during the Constitutional debates—disagreed
about whether the government could punish libelous speech after the fact.
But even those who believed that states could punish speech after the fact
were doing so based on a definition of “liberty of the press.”107 The First
Amendment, added after the ratification of the Constitution, adds “the
freedom of speech” to that provision. Libel may or may not have been
associated with freedom of the press, thus allowing the provision “the freedom of speech” to supplement our notions of what the common law pro101. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Humphreys (Mar. 18, 1789), in
14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 676–79 (Julian P. Boyd ed. 1958).
102. Id.
103. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 100 (emphasis added).
104. See Campbell, supra note 54, at 305 (“This liberty [of freedom of speech],
moreover, was circumscribed by social obligations—either imposed by natural law
or voluntarily assumed in a social contract—and therefore only restrictions of expression beyond those that promoted the public good were ‘abridgments’ of natural
rights.”).
105. See id. at 306–07.
106. See id. at 254–55.
107. See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA RATIFICATION CONVENTION DEBATES (Dec. 1, 1787)
(statement of James Wilson), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION 455 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1976) (“The
idea of liberty of the press is not carried so far as this in any country—what is
meant by liberty of the press is, that there should be no antecedent restraint upon
it; but that every author is responsible when he attacks the security or welfare of
the government or the safety, character, and property of the individual.”).
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tected. Additionally, truth as a defense to libel seems to have developed
prior to the drafting of the First Amendment.108
Our current libel laws can be seen as resolving the disagreement over
whether libelous speech could be punished through compromise; the solution was to insulate deceptive speech, but only in certain circumstances—for example, a public figure will succeed in a defamation suit
against a defendant whose speech was knowingly or recklessly false. Our
current semi-categorical, semi-balancing approach to libel encapsulates an
understanding of the “common good” that is administratively more predictable, leading to less chilling of speech, even if legislatures,109 not
judges, were originally empowered to decide what was in the common
good. Part III will detail how our current doctrine does and does not harmonize with incorporating common law baselines, as modified by natural
rights.
B.

The Ninth Amendment and the Common Law

The history surrounding the ratification of the Bill of Rights and the
text and structure of the Constitution support the use of the common law
as a baseline for understanding the original public meaning of “the freedom of speech.” Judges often look to the common law to determine the
original meaning of a constitutional right. As one example of equating
originalist understandings with common law practices, in a concurrence in
the denial of certiorari, Justice Thomas admonished the Court for using a
“policy-driven approach to the Constitution.”110 Instead, he believed the
Justices should “carefully examine the original meaning of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.”111 Justice Thomas looked to the common law
of libel at the time the two Amendments were ratified, noting that “there
are sound reasons to question whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments displaced this body of common law,”112 which he assumed “formed
the backdrop against which the First and Fourteenth Amendments were
ratified.”113
108. Griffin, supra note 21, at 105; see also supra note 86 (discussing the
Zenger trial).
109. Campbell, supra note 54, at 287 (“Consequently, although the freedom
of opinion was fixed in some respects—allowing individuals to criticize the government in good faith, for instance—determining its scope called for the same policydriven analysis that characterized the Founders’ general approach to natural
rights. In short, outside of the core protection for well-intentioned statements of
one’s thoughts, the boundaries of the freedom of opinion depended on political
rather than judicial judgments.”).
110. McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 676 (2019).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. Justice Thomas cited to a law review article about judicial power, but
this article supported only his claim that the common law delineated private rights
in reputation. See id. (citing Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 559, 567 (2007)).
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This practice of using the common law to determine original public
meaning is more justified if the Constitution was intended to enshrine the
rights and duties that existed at the time of drafting, and less justified if a
given constitutional provision was either orthogonal to, or directly contrary to, the common law.114 Indeed, many scholars believe our Founders
intended for the First Amendment to supersede aspects of the common
law.115 Plus, just because the First Amendment may not have explicitly
overruled the common law does not necessarily indicate that those ratifying the Constitution considered the common law to form a backdrop
against which free speech protections should be granted. It also does not
necessarily mean that citizens would regard the Constitution as operating
against a backdrop of common law rights and duties.
However, there is good evidence that the First Amendment enshrined
many “existing concepts.”116 According to Professor Jud Campbell, “to the
extent that Founding Era elites originally understood the First Amendment as imposing determinate limits on congressional power, these limits
were delineated by accepted common-law rules and by the inalienable natural right to make well-intentioned statements of one’s thoughts.”117 The
right to “the freedom of speech” was likely much broader than the common law protection against prior restraints,118 but the common law—in
conjunction with an understanding of natural rights119—should form a
baseline against which we assess how free speech protections interact with
the harms caused by speech. The interaction of the common law and natural rights will be discussed later in this Section, but this assessment of the
First Amendment as enshrining common law concepts and structures is
textually supported by the Ninth Amendment.
The inclusion of the Ninth Amendment in the Constitution supports
the presumption that an entire edifice of legal rights and traditions that
existed at the time of the Constitution’s ratification should be considered
when interpreting the Constitution. The Ninth Amendment provides that
“[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con114. See generally James E. Fleming, The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 433, 448–50 (2013) (exploring the difference between Justice
Scalia’s and Justice Stevens’s originalist interpretations of the Second Amendment,
including whether it codified the common law’s right to self-defense).
115. See supra Introduction.
116. Campbell, supra note 54, at 256.
117. Id.
118. Even Leonard Levy, who argues that history does not support a broad
reading of the First Amendment (but would go beyond history in determining free
speech protections), noted that restrictions on prior restraints are simply the start
to First Amendment analysis. LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 12, at xi. The government could punish people for abuse of the freedom of the press, so “[t]he test for
criminal abuse of freedom of the press constituted the real problem.” Id. The fact
that freedom of speech should be interpreted more broadly than simply freedom
from prior restrains is also supported by the fact that freedom of speech and freedom of the press were listed as two separate protections in the First Amendment.
119. See infra Section I.C.
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strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”120 This
Amendment could support the inclusion of common law rights and duties
in two ways—(1) directly, through direct protection of common law
rights/duties in the Ninth Amendment, or (2) by analogy, through an understanding—evidenced in part by the Ninth Amendment—that pre-constitutional frameworks remain despite the enumeration in text of a written
Constitution. The latter idea—that the Ninth Amendment imports the
use of common law baselines by analogy—is more persuasive.
The Ninth Amendment reminds readers “that there are rights other
than those in the text of the Constitution that should be recognized as
constitutional.”121 Although the Ninth Amendment has in the past been
referred to as an “inkblot,”122 due to its lack of relevance to constitutional
decision-making, scholars have focused for decades on how to give the
provision meaning.123 Theories that certain rights are directly provided
for by the Ninth Amendment, which could overturn state and federal law,
are controversial and political,124 such as Justice Goldberg’s suggestion, in
a concurrence, that the Ninth Amendment provides one of the bases for
overturning Connecticut’s ban on contraception.125
Some scholars have also argued for a more modest interpretation of
the Ninth Amendment—that it serves as a “rule of construction.”126
Under this approach, instead of providing rights that judges can use to
overturn democratically elected laws, the Ninth Amendment is triggered
only when judges must determine the scope of enumerated rights—they
cannot be used to deny or disparage other “retained” unenumerated or
even enumerated rights.127 Retained rights are thus especially important
when they conflict with enumerated rights, and courts cannot use enumerated rights in a way that limits or otherwise accords second-class status to
120. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
121. Jackson, supra note 56, at 167–68. Jackson argues that courts should use
the common law, as articulated by William Blackstone, to determine a baseline
against which they can judge whether common usage, tradition, and practice supports identifying a “present-day rights” pursuant to the Ninth Amendment. Id. at
172. Jackson is using the common law as a baseline in a different sense than this
article; he means that Blackstone’s common law is a reference point for determining whether rights are sufficiently part of our legal and cultural tradition to be
considered part of the rights covered by the Ninth Amendment. See id. at 170.
122. Ryan Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of Construction, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 498, 500 n.1 (2011).
123. Cristina Carmody Tilley, Rescuing Dignitary Torts from the Constitution, 78
BROOK. L. REV. 65, 77 (2012).
124. Id. at 77–78.
125. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
126. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 122, at 509 (arguing that instead of creating
independent, judicially enforceable rights or protecting federalism concerns, “the
Ninth Amendment’s sole function as providing a response to a very specific form
of argument—namely, that the enumeration of rights in the Constitution might be
used as a basis for limiting or denying other claimed rights”).
127. Id. at 572–73.
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other retained rights.128 For example, if rights associated with the Eighth
Amendment are retained in the Ninth Amendment, this approach would
suggest that the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment could not
be interpreted to exclude capital punishment simply because the Fifth
Amendment alludes to the death penalty, if the ban on cruel and unusual
punishment is a right retained in the Ninth Amendment.129
Some scholars argue that the Ninth Amendment imports, even if simply as a rule of construction, particular common law rights that might affect courts’ interpretations of “the freedom of speech,” including, for
example, a right to reputation, and possibly to privacy or some degree of
emotional tranquility.130 The existence of these Ninth Amendment
“rights” might mean that the First Amendment has less to say in the area
of libel law, due to the Ninth Amendment’s “right” to reputation.
This approach is undermined by the fact that the first eight Amendments generally specify negative liberties131—rights against restraints on
liberty by government action or coercion. When the first eight Amendments specify positive liberties, they obligate the government to provide
certain procedural rights when taking away one’s liberty or property—
such as trial rights.132 Common law torts like defamation and invasion of
privacy are instead rights people have against each other,133 which are
safeguarded by the state, not against state interference.134 Further, torts
128. Tilley, supra note 123, at 78.
129. Williams, supra note 122, at 558–60.
130. See, e.g., Tilley, supra note 123, at 66 (arguing “that defamation, invasion
of privacy, and intentional infliction [of emotional distress] are entitled to constitutional respect and are protected by the Ninth Amendment from intraconstitutional diminishment”).
131. “Negative liberties protect someone’s right to do X, while positive liberties require someone else to provide the wherewithal to do X.” Christopher H.
Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495, 518 n.86 (1986). The distinction between negative and positive liberties was articulated in a seminal article
by Isaiah Berlin. See ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY, in FOUR ESSAYS ON
LIBERTY 118, 121–22 (1969).
132. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”), amend. II
(protecting right to “bear arms” against government interference), amend. III
(prohibiting the quartering of soldiers in people’s homes), amend. IV (preventing
“unreasonable searches and seizures” by the government), amend. V (protecting
trial rights, including “due process”), amend. VI (protecting rights during “criminal prosecutions”), amend. VII (preserving right to trial by jury), amend. VIII
(preventing cruel or unusual punishment and excessive bails and fines).
133. These rights—ones that the government provides by restricting other
people’s actions with respect to each other—are generally called “positive liberties,” but that should be distinguished from what is also called “positive rights”
later in the Article, which are those natural rights that require a system of government for their existence, such as the right to a trial by jury. See supra notes 79 and
81 and accompanying text.
134. The seminal article discussing the Ninth Amendment as a rule of construction notes that certain constitutional provisions apply only against the state.
Ryan Williams argues that the Ninth Amendment does not permit interpreting a
constitutional right broadly enough to encompass rights against private action if
that would infringe on the retained right to freedom of speech. See Williams, supra
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protecting emotional tranquility, and even most privacy torts, did not become part of state common law until well after the ratification of the First
Amendment, and even after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.135 Thus, even if the Ninth Amendment, as a rule of construction,
provides for some common law “rights” that the government must affirmatively provide, privacy rights and rights to emotional tranquility would not
be included.
Although the right to reputation was included as part of the core private right to personal security under the common law conception of
rights,136 the Ninth Amendment’s placement in the first ten Amendments
indicates that the Ninth Amendment, to the extent it invokes independent
judicially enforceable rights exists as a rule of construction, is likely referencing negative rights. The Ninth Amendment then would not be enshrining state-law duties to be protected by the federal Constitution under
the Ninth Amendment. Of course, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
reserve certain powers to the states, but this reservation would simply
mean that the states could regulate defamation to protect individuals’ reputations if this regulation did not conflict with the First Amendment. The
Ninth Amendment cannot persuasively or effectively function as a method
for meting out private rights against other individuals (and not against the
government), given the reason the Ninth Amendment was placed in the
Constitution. The purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to protect federnote 122, at 562. According to Williams, because of the Ninth Amendment, the
equality values expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be used to restrict
the First Amendment’s protection of hate speech, because freedom of speech is a
“retained right.” Id. To wit:
By its express terms, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause prohibits only discriminatory conduct by state actors, and a refusal
to prohibit private discriminatory speech, no matter how hateful or abusive, does not constitute state action sufficient to give rise to a Fourteenth
Amendment violation. Because the Equal Protection Clause neither requires nor expressly allows governmental limitations of private speech,
“construing” that provision to limit the scope of the First Amendment’s
protection of free speech would be impermissible under the Ninth
Amendment’s express command.
Id. (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court also understands the Constitution as
mainly protecting negative rights, not positive rights like those to economic redistribution or education. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 551–53 (2006).
135. See Tilley, supra note 123, at 93 (discussing English common law’s adoption of tort of intentional infliction of nervous shock in 1897); id. at 103 (discussing American scholarship on the need for privacy torts in 1890); id. at 104 (noting
a “1936 article often credited as the springboard for the American tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress”). For a more thorough articulation of the
state of the common law in covering dignitary torts at the time of the First Amendment’s ratification, see infra Section III.A.
136. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129 (“The right of personal security consists in a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his
limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation.”). The right to reputation was considered an “absolute right,” meaning that “every man” was entitled to its enjoyment, “whether out of society or in it.” Id. at *119.
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alism and to ensure that people understood that individual freedoms were
not limited to the negative rights enumerated in the first eight
Amendments.137
Thus, the Ninth Amendment likely does not directly safeguard particular positive rights that must be provided by the state or federal governments and may override free speech rights. The intuition that the
common law is a good source for a historical understanding of our constitutional rights, however, is supported by the text of the Ninth
Amendment.
A less politically charged way to remedy the obsolescence of the Ninth
Amendment would be to appreciate the Ninth Amendment’s role in invoking an approach to the law that existed prior to the enumeration of
rights. Under this theory, if the Ninth Amendment contains rights retained by the people despite their lack of enumeration,138 then by analogy, the Framers were explicitly acknowledging, preserving, and retaining
the pre-constitutional legal system and methodologies that should be safeguarded despite enumeration of rights. Independent of the specific rights
protected by the Ninth Amendment, the existence of the Ninth Amendment demonstrates that those ratifying the Constitution were, to some degree, importing a pre-constitutional framework into their interpretation of
the Constitution.
The Ninth Amendment indicates and alerts us that an entire edifice
of rights and duties existed at the time of the ratification of the First
Amendment, and our constitutional rights should be interpreted using
that context. As a result, the common law—as it existed at the time of
ratification of the First and Fourteenth Amendment, and the fully developed view of “natural rights” shared by the Framers and Americans—
should give cultural context to any interpretation of the Constitution.139
The common law “method of adjudication” informed people of their
rights at the Founding.140 If the common law provided specific rights that
were referenced in the Ninth Amendment,141 it also, by analogy, should
137. Many involved in the drafting and ratification process worried that including a bill of rights would trivialize rights and cause people to assume a right
was either enumerated or lost. Massachusetts Congressional Representative Theodore Sedgwick, for example, objected to enumerating a right to assemble because,
“[i]f people freely converse together, they must assemble for that purpose; it is a
self-evident, unalienable right which the people possess; it is certainly a thing that
never would be called in question; it is derogatory to the dignity of the House to
descend to such minutiae.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (Joseph Gales ed. 1834). The
Ninth Amendment was intended to alleviate this concern.
138. According to Jeffrey Jackson, the Ninth Amendment “evidences a whole
body of preexisting rights.” Jackson, supra note 56, at 175.
139. For an explanation of natural rights and why they should influence our
understanding of the First Amendment, see supra Section II.A.
140. Jackson, supra note 56, at 170–71.
141. This Article does not take a view as to which rights are contained in the
Ninth Amendment, or even whether the Ninth Amendment specifies particular
rights that can invalidate state or federal law or should, instead, be used only as a
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be used as a historical baseline against which we should interpret our
other constitutional rights.
This proposal means, in other words, that the Ninth Amendment
does not necessarily directly protect certain common law interests, like the
interest in reputation, but that the Ninth Amendment alludes to an entire
system of pre-constitutional thinking and methodologies of adjudication
that must be considered when interpreting enumerated rights. The scope
of the First Amendment, and how far the protections for freedom of
speech extend, should be understood based on background understandings of the common law that existed at the time of the ratification of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Courts should therefore understand the common law as forming a
baseline against which we assess our free speech rights, which should also
be informed by the Framers’ and ratifiers’ understanding of “natural
rights.” What the Ninth Amendment does, by analogy, is explicitly reference a whole set of laws and rights that might not necessarily be disrupted
by enumeration.
C.

The Fourteenth Amendment Does Not Change Much of The Paradigm

The First Amendment serves its greatest function as applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The application of free
speech protections to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment necessitates an inquiry into whether the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment alters the common law and natural rights baselines courts
should apply when interpreting the First Amendment. The First Amendment, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment and including
its disallowance of state restrictions upon speech, is somewhat beyond the
scope of this Article. However, I will address this issue briefly. For several
reasons, the existence of the Fourteenth Amendment should not greatly
influence the common law baselines supplied to analyze free speech cases.
First, the Fourteenth Amendment does not change how the common
law prioritizes an understanding of harm and determines which positive
liberties and negative liberties are necessary to protect free speech.142
Around the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, harms
against bodily integrity were still considered the most regulable and most
injurious types of harms, followed by harms to reputation, although truth
had become a defense to libel in most states.143 Harms to privacy and
emotional tranquility still were not recognized as separate torts in most
states.144 The Fourteenth Amendment also echoes the state action no“rule of construction,” when analyzing clashes of rights with common law understandings. See Williams, supra note 122, at 500–02, 501 n.8.
142. See supra Part I for analysis of why these issues remain some of the most
divisive in interpreting the First Amendment.
143. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254–55 (1952).
144. See Tilley, supra note 123, at 102–06 (discussing the privacy tort’s creation in the 1890s, except for privacy concerning the commercial use of one’s name
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tions inherent in our current doctrine; the only place the Fourteenth
Amendment might establish an affirmative duty on the states to act is to
ensure “the equal protection of the laws,” not in its Due Process or Privileges and Immunities provisions, through which the First Amendment is
most likely incorporated.145 Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment should
not change the general state action notions that apply to the First
Amendment.
Secondly, the Fourteenth Amendment, if anything, should render
free speech doctrine more protective and closer to what current doctrine
looks like today. The Fourteenth Amendment’s freedom of speech conception is either the same or broader than the First Amendment’s,146 such
that the common law duties set as a baseline should not be augmented in
a way that would encroach upon First Amendment freedoms. Around the
time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, politicians and citizens were aware of how state law had been marshalled to suppress antislavery speech.147 In addition, from 1800 to 1860, most politicians treated
the Sedition Act as unconstitutional.148
Those responsible for drafting and ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment did not appear to wish to change free speech baselines. Abraham
Lincoln read Blackstone and recommended the Commentaries to prospective lawyers.149 Blackstone also deemed slavery “repugnant to reason, and
the principles of natural law.”150 Although a full inquiry into this topic is
beyond the scope of this Article, most originalists do not believe that free
speech protections should be interpreted differently depending on
whether they apply to the states or to the federal government.
In sum, the common law as it existed at the time of the First Amendment’s ratification, as supplemented and modified by natural rights,
should greatly influence how we understand our free speech rights. However, looking to both the common law and natural rights is rife with
problems. Unanswered questions abound, including how should courts,
in a principled way, import the common law into the First Amendment,
and when should courts assume that the First Amendment was intended to
override the common law. Further, courts must consider what to do with
or likeness, and the even later development of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
145. Thomas K. Landry, Unenumerated Federal Rights: Avenues for Application
Against the States, 44 FLA. L. REV. 219, 232–33 (1992).
146. CURTIS, supra note 71, at 5–6.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 5.
149. See LETTER FROM ABRAHAM LINCOLN TO JAMES T. THORNTON (Dec. 2,
1858), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 485 (Roy P. Basler ed.
1946).
150. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *423; see also id. at *424 (“Every
sale implies a price, a quid pro quo, an equivalent given to the seller in lieu of what
he transfers to the buyer: but what equivalent can be given for life and liberty, both
of which, in absolute slavery, are held to be in the master’s disposal?”).

344

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66: p. 311

current precedent that deviates from the common law at the time of the
ratification, or even with approaches—such as the categorical approach—
that seem inconsistent with how the Framers thought about free speech
rights. Part III begins to address these problems, by first outlining where
free speech doctrine is already consistent with the common law, then addressing what to do about the areas inconsistent with the common law, as
modified by natural rights, and, finally, exploring how a common law approach can lend coherence to free speech doctrine.
III. THE NORMATIVE CASE

FOR

COMMON LAW BASELINES

Part III advances the position that incorporating common law baselines into free speech jurisprudence is, in addition to being supported by
the history, text, and structure of Constitution, normatively desirable. In
this Part, I demonstrate that a common law approach, as viewed through a
natural rights lens, already provides the structure of our free speech rights
and can be harmonized with many aspects of the doctrine. I then confront the areas where this approach is more difficult to reconcile with our
current conception of First Amendment liberties but show how the current construction of our First Amendment doctrine can harmonize with
the incorporation of common law baselines. Finally, I demonstrate why an
approach modeled around common law baselines would lend clarity and
coherence to future free speech cases and discuss new ways to think about
difficult First Amendment issues, such as the treatment of new harms and
the distinction between public-oriented and private-oriented speech.
A.

Common Law Compatibilities

Modern First Amendment jurisprudence is already highly compatible
with a conception of the First Amendment that incorporates common law
baselines. Notwithstanding the view of many scholars that current First
Amendment doctrine is a modern invention,151 several aspects of our free
speech regime harmonize well with the original public meaning of “the
freedom of speech,” if common law baselines and natural rights are employed. The common law can be used as a guide to determine when the
state has affirmative obligations to protect an individual’s speech and
which harms caused by speech can be prevented through regulation or
tort law.
First, the common law sets out a system of reciprocal rights and duties,152 which can help determine when the state has abridged speech.
Determining when the state has acted to infringe free speech rights—ver151. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 71, at 9 (“Strong judicial protection of speech
is a worthy tradition. It is also a comparatively recent one.”).
152. Common law rights and duties are reciprocal because each person owes
them to others and receives them from others. For example, no one can invade
my bodily integrity without consent, and I cannot invade others’ bodily integrity
without their consent.

2021]

FIRST AMENDMENT BASELINES

345

sus when a private party has instead exercised its rights to control
speech—is necessary to applying the First Amendment.153 A common law
approach justifies our current state action doctrine and helps answer questions about when the state has acted and when the state must act with
respect to speech.
Under a common law approach, affirmative state action to enforce
property law, contract law, and other private rights should not affect the
coverage of the First Amendment. These common law rights are protected by the state as a baseline, and even if their enforcement interferes
with someone’s speech, the First Amendment’s state action doctrine will
not be triggered. In other words, the state has not acted when it enforces
these common law rights because they are a baseline against which we
measure state action, even though the state is affirmatively acting. If A
demands that B leave B’s property because of B’s politics, and the state
enforces A’s property rights, B is essentially being removed by the state
due to B’s politics, but there is no First Amendment violation. The state
was simply performing its baseline duties of enforcing reciprocal property
rights.
This regime preserves A’s free speech rights by allowing A to make
choices about which speech to allow on A’s own property. This approach
also ensures that property rights are protected without that protection triggering First Amendment scrutiny. This is important because the state has
not acted in a censorious way: its actions are simply applying property law
neutrally. Generally speaking, therefore, the state’s actions will trigger
free speech scrutiny only when it acts directly and primarily with respect to
speech. If the state acts in a way that targets speech or directly implicates
speech, the First Amendment will be involved, but not if the state is acting
simply to enforce common law rights and duties. This also explains the
doctrine involving expressive conduct: if the government acts to regulate
conduct, those laws will generally not present First Amendment problems
unless the government is targeting the expressive components of that
conduct.154
Additionally, the state has few affirmative duties. The common law
methodology, however, does support a speech-protective approach to the
“heckler’s veto,” a thorny and somewhat contested area of free speech doctrine.155 If an individual is engaging in protected speech that provokes an
angry mob (but does not rise to the level of incitement), the state should
not acquiesce to the heckler’s veto by arresting the speaker but should first
discharge its affirmative duty to protect, instead of silence, that speaker.156
153. See supra Section I.A.
154. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
155. See R. George Wright, The Heckler’s Veto Today, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
159, 159–60 (2017).
156. According to an en banc Eighth Circuit opinion, “before removing the
speaker due to safety concerns, and thereby permanently cutting off his speech,
the police must first make bona fide efforts to protect the speaker from the
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This duty comports with the state’s affirmative obligations, under the common law, to protect our right to bodily integrity as against attack by
others.157 Those wishing to attack the speaker are doing so based on what
may be well-intentioned statements of the speaker’s thoughts, and the
speaker has a right to bodily integrity. This approach also prevents the
state from deciding when to protect a speaker from assault on the basis of
the speaker’s content or viewpoint, the most pernicious forms of
censorship.158
In addition to supporting a coherent state action doctrine and its related doctrines about when the state has acted and when the state must act
(i.e., in cases of the heckler’s veto), the common law approach creates a
spectrum of harms that comports with our current understanding of how
free speech liberties should interact with the harms caused by speech. Because the common law defines harms and places them on a spectrum of
importance when considered against free speech interests, the common
law duties that were most sacred at the time of the First Amendment’s
ratification will be least displaced by free speech doctrine, and those that
were not protected at all will be most displaced by free speech liberties.
Additionally, the natural law at the time of the ratification protected wellintentioned statements of one’s thoughts in the absence of direct injury.159 The common law can define which injuries are direct injuries.
As a result, behavior that causes emotional and dignitary harms, with
no economic injury, are largely un-regulable because they conflict with
free speech doctrine. Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED),
as a tort, did not exist at the time of the ratification of the First Amendment,160 and most states also did not accept that tort at the time of the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.161 Privacy torts also were first
crowd’s hostility by other, less restrictive means.” Bible Believers v. Wayne County,
805 F.3d 228, 255 (8th Cir. 2015).
157. Blackstone articulated a right against having one’s body meddled with
“in any the slightest manner.” According to Blackstone,
[t]he least touching of another’s person wilfully, or in anger, is a battery;
for the law cannot draw the line between different degrees of violence,
and therefore totally prohibits the first and lowest stage of it; every man’s
person being sacred, and no other having a right to meddle with it in any
the slightest manner. . . . But battery is, in some cases, justifiable or lawful; as where one who hath authority, a parent, or master, gives moderate
correction to his child, his scholar, or his apprentice.
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *120 (footnote omitted).
158. See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”).
159. See supra Section II.B.
160. English common law did not recognize the tort of intentional infliction
of “nervous shock” until 1897. See Tilley, supra note 123, at 93.
161. “There is little documentation that courts vindicated claims of emotional
distress through defamation or other avenues at the time of the ratification.” Id. at
104. By the late 1800s, emotional injuries were compensated parasitic to other
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proposed well after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,162 with
an exception possibly being a precursor to the right to publicity—a privacy
tort that protects one’s likeness from being appropriated in ways that benefit the appropriator financially.163 This spectrum of the prioritization of
harms accords well with our current doctrine, where IIED torts that involve speech on a matter of public concern are entirely trumped by the
First Amendment,164 as are many privacy torts,165 with the exception of
torts involving the right to publicity—which is grounded in property interests more than privacy interests.166 The conception of natural rights protected well-intentioned statements of one’s thoughts, however, so the final
Section of this Article will address how to deal with IIED where the
thoughts are not “well-intentioned.”167
In the middle of the spectrum of the ability of the government to
prevent harms caused by speech, at common law, certain harms could be
somewhat regulated notwithstanding free speech claims. Defamation and
libel were well-protected by the common law, although they were limited
somewhat by the natural rights of speaking and writing, which were protected by juries. By the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, many states
had accepted truth as a defense to libel, a strain of thought that dates back
to the Zenger trial.168
Although the next Section will confront the commonly held belief
that common law understandings of defamation and libel are inconsistent
with current free speech doctrine, their place on the spectrum of harms is
compensable injuries, a freestanding tort of IIED did not develop until the 20th
century. See id.
162. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s famous seminal article proposing a
tort protecting the right to privacy was written in 1890. Samuel Warren & Louis
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
163. See Tilley, supra note 123, at 99, 102–03 (discussing how although
“[u]ntil the early 1900s, the only common-law cause of action permitting redress
for dignitary harms was defamation,” sometimes defamation suits compensated for
privacy injuries, mostly in cases sounding in misappropriation of one’s image). An
English case in 1898 held, for example, that plaintiffs cannot enjoin publications
that use their images and likenesses in unauthorized ways unless the unauthorized
use harms their reputation or property interests. Dockrell v. Dougall (1898) 78
L.T. (N.S.) 840. Emotional distress from unauthorized use of one’s image or likeness was not actionable. Id.
164. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S, 443, 458 (2011) (overturning $11
million jury verdict on IIED because the outrageous and offensive speech at issue,
protesting American policy using anti-gay vitriol, at military funerals, involved a
matter of public concern).
165. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528–34 (2001) (holding that federal
wiretapping prohibitions cannot be applied to broadcasting of illegally taped
phone conversation when the broadcaster innocently acquired the conversation,
which involved a matter of public concern).
166. See Hart v. Electr. Arts Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he
goal of maintaining a right of publicity is to protect the property interest that an
individual gains and enjoys in his identity through his labor and effort.”).
167. See infra Part III.
168. See supra note 86.
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consistent with modern doctrine. In modern free speech doctrine, courts
must balance reputational harms against free speech concerns. Even public figures can win libel lawsuits so long as the speech at issue was intentionally or recklessly false.169 The First Amendment does not entirely
displace defamation law, consistent with importing common law baselines
into free speech jurisprudence.
Indeed, in United States v. Alvarez,170 a plurality of the Supreme Court
noted that lies are still protected as a category of speech, but they can be
punished if they lead to concrete, cognizable injury, like reputational
harm or fraud.171 Alvarez’s understanding about speech causing direct injury is consistent with a common law approach. Although the concurrence in Alvarez does mention IIED as a concrete injury where false speech
is not protected, the Alvarez Court seemed to require that this injury be
inflicted directly and not involve a matter of public concern to remain
outside the First Amendment’s protection.172
Indeed, according to the analysis in Alvarez, if a lie affects others’ dignity or sense of honor, instead of being defamatory or fraudulent, laws
regulating that sort of harm are subject to strict scrutiny.173 In Alvarez, for
example, because the harm was to veterans’ sense of pride in their accomplishments and to the integrity of the system for awarding military honors,
the Stolen Valor Act was invalidated for failing to satisfy strict scrutiny.174
At the least protected end of the spectrum are speech harms related
to assault and bodily integrity. “True threats”175 that place people in reasonable fear of bodily harm and “incitement to imminent lawless action”176 are unprotected categories of speech. The state may punish these
without performing any balancing test, based on the common law rights to
bodily integrity. The spectrum of how much speech rights supersede the
harms caused by speech, from assault-type harms to reputational harms to
emotional injuries, is quite consistent with setting common law baselines.
This harms regime is as it should be because emotional and dignitary
injuries are those most likely caused by the viewpoint of speech, where
jurors are afforded the most discretion to punish offensive speech. The
169. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (establishing “actual malice” standard applicable to public officials suing newspaper for
defamation).
170. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
171. Id. at 719.
172. See id. at 734 (Breyer, J., concurring). In dissent, Justice Alito noted that
false speech may be punished if associated with torts like IIED and false light privacy claims, even though these torts did not exist at the time of the ratification of
the First Amendment, but cited cases expanding free speech protections and nullifying dignitary claims for IIED and invasion of privacy unless there was malicious
falsity. See id. at 746–47 (Alito, J., dissenting).
173. See id. at 725–26.
174. Id. at 724.
175. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
176. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
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right to publicity, on the other hand, stifles the speech of only those who
wish to gain financially from one’s likeness or reputation, and those people should compensate others for the intellectual property in their
personage.
Other examples abound. Prior restraints are still considered much
worse from a free speech perspective than after-the-fact punishment for
speech.177 The broad outlines of First Amendment doctrine are easily organized using a common law approach. The specifics are perhaps less justified, but there are many areas where the specifics are justified.
B.

Common Law Incompatibilities

Most scholars and judges believe that modern First Amendment doctrine was created in the twentieth century, and that certain aspects are
deeply inconsistent with a common law approach to free speech.178 It is
true that the doctrine today is not the same as the doctrine was in 1791.
Yet, the doctrine can be traced back to themes from our common law
history. Although there are areas where First Amendment doctrine has
abandoned a common law approach, many superficial incompatibilities
between a common law approach and First Amendment are accounted for
elsewhere in the doctrine.
For example, our current set of First Amendment protections for libel
law make it exceptionally difficult for public figures to remedy harm to
their reputations. Public figures and officials must show not only that the
defamatory speech was false but also that it was maliciously false—either
intentionally false or uttered with a reckless disregard for the truth.179
This “actual malice” standard, in addition to the fact that even private
figures must show at least negligence with respect to falsity,180 is contrary
to the common law view that libelous speech can be punished—especially
libelous speech against the government181—and to the many trials and
punishments for libel around the time of the ratification of the First
Amendment.182
177. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (“The thread
running through all these cases is that prior restraints on speech and publication
are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights.”).
178. See, e.g., Lakier, supra note 12, at 2214–15 (“By requiring courts to extend
full First Amendment protection to everything that we would today consider
speech for constitutional purposes except when the government can affirmatively
point to a long-settled tradition of regulating speech of this sort, the test strictly
limits when and how the government can regulate even subversive, immoral, or
otherwise plainly dangerous speech. It thus establishes a constitutional regime of
speech regulation that looks nothing like that which existed in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.”).
179. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
180. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
181. LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 12, at 7–8.
182. Id. at 29–61.
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However, several aspects of the common law view of libel are accounted for elsewhere in our approach to free speech protections. For
one, the common law and the approach at the time of the ratification
considered the harm from criminal libel to be a breach of the peace.183
Blackstone allowed truth to be a defense to civil libel, but not criminal
libel, where the predominant concern is a breach of the peace.184 (By the
time of the First Amendment’s ratification, truth as a defense to libel had
become commonplace among states.)185 Modern doctrine incorporates
this common law concern by removing from First Amendment protection
the category of speech known as “incitement.” Speech that is directed to
and is reasonably likely to produce imminent lawless action is not
protected.186
This exception to First Amendment protection for incitement makes
the strictness of libel laws less necessary and resolves, through doctrinal
compromise, the competing views about the punishment of libel that were
aired during the Sedition Act debates.187 Plus, the “actual malice” standard protects (and gives breathing room around) well-intentioned statements of one’s thoughts, preserving the natural rights conception that
existed at the time of the Founding.188 Further, just as today, speech on
matters of public concern was, in some ways, more protected at the Founding. Even though libel against the government was considered potentially
more injurious to public order, states also offered more immunizations for
allegedly libelous speech that involved official conduct or information important to the public.189
There are more fundamental, and more general, apparent inconsistencies between modern free speech jurisprudence and a common law
and natural rights approach. For example, modern doctrine relies on a
strong judicial role in protecting speech, using a semi-categorical approach that protects a wide swath of speech almost absolute, subjecting
content-based restrictions on most protected speech to strict scrutiny.190
Natural rights theory protected well-intentioned statements of one’s
thoughts, unless they caused direct injury,191 but beyond that, the legislature was entrusted to make determinations about which restrictions on
183. Sir Edward Coke, De Libelous Famosis, in 3 THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD
COKE 254 (1572–1617).
184. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *150–53.
185. See Lakier, supra note 12, at 2184–85.
186. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
187. See supra note 1.
188. See supra Part II.
189. See Lakier, supra note 12, at 2184–85.
190. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (subjecting
content-based restrictions on the sale of violent video games to strict scrutiny and
overturning California law restricting the sale of violent video games to minors).
191. Campbell, supra note 54, at 260.
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speech promoted the common good.192 According to Professor Campbell, “the First Amendment did not enshrine a judgment that the costs of
restricting expression outweigh the benefits. At most, it recognized only a
few established rules, leaving broad latitude for the people and their representatives to determine which regulations of expression would promote
the public good.”193 Modern doctrine appears to do the opposite,
preventing the government from deciding which speech is good or valuable and protecting a vast array of what many believe is undesirable speech
without subjecting it to harms-balancing.194
Or perhaps leaving these issues to the legislature was appropriate in
an era where the First Amendment did not apply to the states. In addition, our current placement of policing boundaries placed upon the legislature in the judiciary, so that the government cannot decide which
speech is in the common good, may be a permissible implementation of
the original understanding of free speech doctrine.195 According to
Campbell, “a natural-rights reading of the First Amendment would require
the government to act for reasons that promote the public good, and
modern doctrine can perhaps be understood, or justified, as prophylactic
rules that help ferret out illicit motives.”196 This is especially so because
current constitutional doctrine, especially since New York Times v. Sullivan,197 gives a lot less deference to the legislature generally; our judiciary
is much more activist now.
Originalists might describe this implementation of the original understanding of the meaning of speech as a permissible “construction”—giving
legal effect to text in a way that is not inconsistent with the text.198 There
is ambiguity in the meaning of the freedom of speech, and the early American experience with seditious libel trials demonstrates that even those
who believed in free speech as a principle often used their power, once
obtained, to censor their enemies.199 Given this context, expanding the
192. Id. at 316 (“Historically, it was up to legislators to assess which restrictions of speech would best serve the common good, with very little room for judicial oversight.”).
193. Id. at 257.
194. For example, Chief Justice Roberts in United States v. Stevens described
the government’s view that the creation of new categories of unprotected speech,
such as speech depicting animal torture, should be based on “a categorical balancing of the value of the speech against its societal costs” as “startling and dangerous.” 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (quoting Brief for the United States at 8, Stevens,
559 U.S. 460 (No. 08-769)).
195. Campbell, supra note 54, at 264.
196. Id.
197. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
198. According to Lawrence Solum, “ ‘Constitutional interpretation’ is the activity that discerns the communicative content (linguistic meaning) of the constitutional text. ‘Constitutional construction’ is the activity that determines the content
of constitutional doctrine and the legal effect of the constitutional text.” Solum,
supra note 22, at 457.
199. CHAFEE, JR., supra note 13, at 27–30.
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power of the judiciary to place most speech in a protected category and
holding that content-based speech regulation is generally not in the “common good”—and thus impermissible for the legislature to do without a
compelling reason—can be reconciled with an original understanding of
the freedom of speech, if one allows for an expansive judicial role in creating legal doctrine. “The heightened scrutiny that applies to content-based
regulations, for instance, may correspond to an increased risk of parochial, rather than public-spirited, objectives.”200 First Amendment doctrine thus sets firm boundaries to prevent legislatures from impermissibly
and pretextually regulating speech with bad motives, judicially preserving
our natural rights.
Further, First Amendment doctrine currently follows a semi-categorical approach, so the judiciary must determine which categories of speech
are considered high value, and thus subject to strict scrutiny. Professor
Genevieve Lakier argues that the New Deal Court invented our system of
categorizing speech as high value—and worthy of extremely robust protection—or categorizing speech as low value—and worthy of almost no protection. She draws largely upon state law from the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries because the First Amendment had not yet been incorporated against the states, and there was scant federal free speech case
law. Nevertheless, there was widespread agreement “that the First Amendment did not create new rights but merely declared—in order to better
protect—rights that existed prior to its ratification and that were guaranteed also by the speech and press clauses provided for in all the state constitutions.”201 This methodology is sound for understanding how states
viewed free speech protections.
However, the doctrine under our current categorical approach does
not look much different than our historical common law approach. Professor Lakier’s examples do not entirely bear out her thesis. Indeed, many
of the current unprotected or low value categories of speech received similar treatment as they do today, even if courts’ approaches were not exactly
the same as now. Fighting words were generally unprotected if they had a
tendency to lead to a breach of the peace,202 and today the fighting words
doctrine is basically limited to that context. For libel, states generally protected truthful speech as non-libelous,203 and the same is true now. Obscenity was prosecuted at common law, even before the fact, because states
could target the sale and distribution of obscene materials, if not the sale
itself.204 And although the government was mostly prevented simply from
placing prior restraints on high value speech, Professor Campbell’s understanding of natural rights protection for the well-intentioned statements of
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Campbell, supra note 54, at 314.
Lakier, supra note 12, at 2177–78.
Id. at 2190–91.
Id. at 2184–85.
Id. at 2188–89.
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one’s thoughts greatly expands notions of what was protected during the
Founding era. The conception of freedom of speech at the Founding,
among many, was far greater than simply the protection against prior
restraints.205
The final Section of this Article will argue that a common law approach is normatively desirable because, in addition to reflecting most of
our current free speech doctrine, it can give coherence to this doctrine
and provide justifications at the margins for particular First Amendment
decisions.
C.

Common Law Coherence, Going Forward

The crafting of modern free speech doctrine may not have intentionally or self-consciously used the common law as a baseline when defining
the scope of First Amendment protections. Even so, to some extent, most
of constitutional law imports common law notions about when the state
has acted and defines “neutrality” in the absence of this type of state action.206 In the First Amendment context, continually checking in with
common law baselines will render the doctrine more coherent and illuminate how we should consider difficult First Amendment problems going
forward. The common law can help define which types of expression are
covered by the First Amendment, which harms to incorporate into our
strict-scrutiny calculus when considering content-based restrictions on
speech, and how to move forward with new types of expression and new
types of restrictions on speech.
A sense of which laws do not implicate the First Amendment is necessary. Setting “speech” apart and designating it as special enables courts to
protect “the freedom of speech” without undoing legislation touching
upon anything with an expressive component.207 Frederick Schauer
rightly points out that some utterances that can easily be defined as speech
are outside the First Amendment’s coverage, and some that are covered,
still receive lesser First Amendment protection.208 The common law can
assist in this endeavor. The common law explains, for example, why securities fraud prohibitions do not implicate speech; fraud in the “acquisition
of goods” was restricted at common law,209 and the harms caused by fraudulent speech are economic in nature. Contract law similarly does not gen205. CHAFEE, JR., supra note 13, at 16–17. In the Maryland convention, a reason for protecting free speech in the Bill of Rights was that this constitutional
protection would “prove invaluable” in federal libel prosecutions. Id. at 17.
206. See Sunstein, supra note 35, at 874.
207. For example, conduct like murder or even theft could, theoretically, be
expressive, but it would be nonsensical to afford these acts First Amendment protection against regulation.
208. Schauer, supra note 6, at 1617–18.
209. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *145.

354

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66: p. 311

erally implicate speech protections, even when the contacts involve
speech.210
Antidiscrimination statutes, which are a relatively new phenomenon,211 sometimes do infringe on protected speech. The conduct of refusing to hire someone based on a protected characteristic or of
discriminating against that person in their job duties clearly does not implicate expression. However, sometimes antidiscrimination statutes implicate expression, or require conduct that contains expressive elements.
Following a common law methodology, expression can be regulated under
these statutes when the cumulative expression is severe or pervasive
enough to deprive individuals of their ability to perform their jobs or receive their educations —in this way, the harm from the speech rises to the
level of depriving claimant of a material, economic benefit. This is essentially the standard for discrimination under federal civil rights statutes.212
Besides delineating First Amendment coverage, the common law can
define which harms are material to constitutional scrutiny when a restriction does target protected expression. When a law restricts speech, the
constitutional scrutiny that applies to the regulation should not countenance particular harms caused by speech that are classically considered
“speech harms,” or harms that arise from paradigmatic instances of expression. In a previous paper, Free Speech Consequentialism, I argue that
harms that are classically speech harms are those that are context dependent, caused by diffuse parties, or mediated mostly through the listener’s
own mind.213 In addition, speech harms cannot be separated from speech
benefits; the ability to anger also affects the ability to create change
through dialog.214 By contrast, when a harm caused by speech can be
analogized to a harm caused by conduct—215 as defined by common law
conduct—then the strict scrutiny applied to speech restrictions can account for this harm. In this way, the characteristics that make speech special are what render it constitutionally protected.
As an example, the economic harms caused by speech can be incorporated into the strict scrutiny applied to a content-based restriction on
that speech, but the emotional and dignitary harms caused by that speech
should not rise to a level sufficient to permit a restriction on protected
speech, at least when that speech involves a matter of public concern or
public interest. Thus, in a case like Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil
210. Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2013)
(describing federal and state court enforcement of private contracts involving
speech restrictions).
211. Tyler S. Smith, Note, A Mid-Life Crisis in the Interpretation of the Iowa Civil
Rights Act of 1965: How Should State Courts Interpret Original Antidiscrimination Statutes
After Federal Counterpart Statutes Are Amended, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 1117, 1122–32
(2016).
212. Bainbridge v. Loffredo Gardens, Inc., 378 F.3d 756, 758 (8th Cir. 2004).
213. Goldberg, supra note 3, at 728–29.
214. Id. at 729–30.
215. Id. at 730.
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Rights Commission,216 where a Christian baker refused to bake a customdesigned cake for a same-sex wedding, the restriction the baker violated
was a Colorado public accommodations statute.217 If baking a customdesigned cake is considered speech or expressive conduct, then when applying strict or intermediate scrutiny to determine whether this antidiscrimination statute was constitutional (the Supreme Court did not address
the free speech issue and instead decided the case on religious animus
grounds),218 the Court could consider the economic reasons justifying application of the public accommodations law but not the emotional or dignitary reasons.219 Forcing a baker to engage in expression (if it is
expression) to avoid stigmatizing individuals or groups is a classic “speech
harm” and should not be countenanced in constitutional scrutiny that applies to speech. However, if Colorado’s main goal is to ensure that gay
couples are not excluded from participation in commerce, that harm is
analogous to one that would be recognized at common law. Similarly, privacy harms involving actual physical transgressions and economic damage
should be more redressable, despite their free speech implications, than
privacy harms without illegal behavior causing only emotional distress.220
One reason the common law adds coherence to our free speech
calculus is because common law rights are, in an important sense, neutral.
At its heart, the common law approached rights as symmetrical and reciprocal. We all have the same rights, which necessarily extend until the exercise of those rights disturbs someone else’s rights. My right to property
extends as far as it can without infringing on someone else’s property
rights. My right to bodily integrity, just like anyone else’s, is a sovereign
space, so that the right must be defined in a way that its correlative duties
are reciprocal. My right to my own body extends until I use that right to
injure someone else’s body. The rights are defined just broadly enough to
allow everyone the same rights.
This approach accords well with First Amendment freedoms. The
First Amendment would be unrecognizable without its commitment to
neutrality, requiring the government to treat everyone the same. Viewpoint neutrality is the quintessential requirement of current First Amendment doctrine. Beyond the common law, many new statutory and tort-law
rights do not contain this sort of reciprocity. That is fine—and we have
moved far beyond the Lochner era when it comes to economic harm—but
216. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
217. Id. at 1723.
218. Id. at 1723–24.
219. Id. at 1746 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (“States cannot punish protected speech because some group finds it offensive, hurtful, stigmatic, unreasonable, or undignified.”).
220. Perhaps IIED and certain privacy harms can still give rise to tort liability
if the speech involves solely a matter of private concern. The Supreme Court has
not yet decided this issue. Given that the natural right of speaking and writing
protected well-intentioned statements of one’s thoughts, purely private invectives
or privacy violations involving expression might be less protected.
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our approach to free speech should remain consistent with the concepts
of neutrality embedded into the common law when a restriction targets
speech.
More newly protected harms, like emotional harm, cannot be reciprocal in the same way as physical harm. My property rights can extend until
they affect your property rights, and this can be defined clearly and reciprocally, even when considering intangible harms like nuisance. I can use
my property unless the sound waves emanating onto your property are too
loud, and you, my neighbor, can do the same. The rights and responsibilities can be clearly defined and apply equally to both neighbors. However,
when it comes to emotional harm, it is more difficult to measure these
harms and it is almost impossible to afford everyone the same reciprocal
rights. If my emotional well-being is protected except to the extent it interferes with your emotional well-being, then people who are more emotionally sensitive will have greater rights. If we define emotional well-being
by a “reasonable person” instead, rights cannot be easily predicted prior to
their being infringed. In addition, juries or judges would find it difficult
to determine that speech caused emotional harm to a reasonable person
without judging the speech based on its viewpoint. An easy and predictable way to ensure that no one is treated better than anyone else on the
basis of viewpoint is to set the common law as a baseline and use its reciprocal rights to determine both the coverage of the First Amendment and
how free speech doctrine should define harms.
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment baseline problems that create division among
judges, scholars, and laypeople are difficult to resolve, but they are not
intractable. The common law, as it existed at the time of the ratification of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, gives some guidance on issues of
both First Amendment coverage—which speech even triggers First
Amendment scrutiny and protection—when protected speech may not be
regulated. Incorporating the common law into free speech doctrine is justified by the text, structure, and history of the First Amendment. A common law approach also harmonizes surprisingly well with current doctrine
and can give coherence to the doctrine. For new emerging areas or new
speech harms, using a common law approach, safeguarded by a strong
judiciary, to determine both First Amendment coverage and protection
can illuminate the way forward.

